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TROXEL AND THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY
Margaret F. Brinig*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Troxel grandparent-visitation case that frames this symposium, I the
Washington statute included in Troxel, the mercifully completed odyssey of
Cuban-born Elian Gonzalez, 2 and the "right to die" case of Hugh Finn 3 all
illustrate both the fervor with which the broader community justifies its
involvement with families and the extremes to which this involvement can
spread. Using constitutional language, advocates point out the rights of
extended family members to continue or strengthen ties to children, whether
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. Special thanks to two
excellent students whose writings provided much of the cross-cultural inspiration for this
piece. They are Annette Tsinnajinnie Brown and Suhana Rai. Two others have done
yeoman's work as research assistants this year. They are Kevin McKeever and Alyson Jones.
I also benefited greatly from the programs and informal discussions of the program on family
violence, University of Virginia, and from my continuing discussions with Robert Ellickson,
Linda Kerber and Steven Nock.
1. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
2. Gonzalez v. Reno, 2000 WL 492102 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000)
3. In the late summer and early fall of 1998, the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area
papers were full of reports concerning the "right-to-die" case of Hugh Finn, a former
newscaster who had been severely injured in an automobile accident some years before. The
Finn case surfaced to public attention when his wife Michele wished to authorize removal of
nutrition and hydration tubes because, according to she and several doctors, he was in a
persistent vegetative state and this was what he would have wanted. Hugh's parents,
Michele's mother, and at least two of Hugh's seven siblings unsuccessfully opposed
Michele's decision through the Virginia Supreme Court, stating that they felt Hugh was aware
and trying to communicate. His parents said that they would take care of him if Michele felt
she no longer could. See, e.g., Vrooke A. Masters & Charles Babington, Glendenning Faults
Gilmore for His Role in Finn Case: Va. Right-to-Die Battle Viewed with "Dismay," WASH.
POST, Oct. 6, 1998, at BI; Steve Twomey, The Finns Deserve True Conservatives, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 1998, at BI. Eventually Virginia Governor James Gilmore and other state
officials also intervened, though unsuccessfully, claiming that Hugh could not speak for
himself and that Virginia legislation authorizing removal of life-support for persons in
persistent vegetative states did not cover Finn's case. See id. (quoting Maryland Governor
Glendenning as saying that Gilmore "completely interfered with Hugh's rights"). Virginia
Delegate Robert G. Marshall reportedly said "Gilmore and I are butting into Michele Finn's
business, but he [Glendenning] wants to butt into Virginia's business?" Masters & Babington,
supra.
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adult or minor. On the other side, parents and spouses claim their own rights
not to have outsiders second-guess or interfere with their decisions. 4
Though many writings about marriage and parenting extol the family's
virtues as a building block of community and society, very few, especially in
the legal context, look at the relationships from inside out.5 My thesis here is
that good family relationships very much need larger communities to begin
them right, support them, and keep them strong. I will argue, however, that
there are limits to the usefulness of outsider involvement-that empowering
outsiders has its own costs. In legal terms, we reach these limits when
multiple third party claimants assert rights to access spouses and children in
ways that substantially conflict with the autonomy families need to function
well, not primarily because of the substantive rights of parents or spouses,
but because of their effect upon the ability to parent and to live within a
functioning marriage. 6
4. This symposium will also consider Justice Stevens's point in his Troxel dissent that
children's own independent rights to association with others who love them will necessarily
be limited by cases like Troxel, a point I personally believe is well worth considering.
5. Familiar counterexamples include the social norms work of James Coleman, such as
APPROACHES TO SOCIAL THEORY (1986); SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL POLICY, ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF JAMES S. COLEMAN (Aaze B. Sorenson & Seymour Spilerman eds., 1993); and the
popular book by HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE (1996).
6. In practical terms, we all know of cases in which in-laws or grandparents have
interfered and made family life intolerable. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Pringle, 144 P.2d 214
(Idaho 1943) (reporting that plaintiff in alienation of affections case alleged that her mother in
law continuously and systematically sought to prejudice and poison the mind of her husband
against her, and to alienate his affections from her by falsely telling him that the plaintiff was
not good enough for him, and occupied a station in life beneath him); Grubb v. Grubb, 90
A.2d 175 (Md. 1952) (reporting that husband refused to be a referee between his mother, who
lived with them, and his wife); Fischer v. Fischer, 34 A.2d 455, 457 (Md. 1943) (stating "A
wife is entitled to a home which is under her control, and is justified in leaving if the husband
permits his mother or other of his relatives to dominate the household, or if he insists on her
living with relatives with whom her relations are unpleasant"); Koch v. Koch, 232 A.2d 157
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (finding that wife justifiably left marital home when she
gave him the choice of living with her or his mother and he chose his mother); Hafner v.
Hafner, 343 A.2d 166 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (following husband's heart attack, he
stayed in his mother's home; plaintiff wife alleged that she was harassed and not permitted to
see him; tort suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress barred by heartbalm statute);
Ziegenfus v. Ziegenfus, 49 A.2d 275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946) (holding wife not guilty of
desertion where husband required her to live with her mother-in-law); Holloway v. Holloway,
27 S.E.2d 457 (S.C. 1943) (holding same); McIlwain v. Mcllwain, 212 S.E.2d 284 (Va. Ct.
App. 1975) (finding, in a divorce action, that husband resented what he considered to be
unwarranted intrusions by his mother-in-law upon his married life); the Sixties' recording hit
"Mother-in-Law" (by Ronnie K. Doe "If she leaves us alone we would have a happy
home/sent from down below/Mother-in Law"); and the recent grandparent-visitation conflict
734 [Vol. 32:733
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The same analysis can proceed from a law-and-economics vantage point
as well. Using a corporate analogy, investment in relationships will be more
efficient if third party monitors have some residual claims to the benefits of
the relationship. Further, social norms and conventions enhance
relationships because they provide verbal and behavioral short cuts for us.
7
"Network externalities" enhance our undertakings in part because of this
common language, and in part because they provide us a kind of insurance.
8
But at the limit is the specter of the outsider who controls the corporate
board. Alternatively, we can visualize the kind of "tragedy of the anti-
commons" proposed by Michigan law professor Michael Heller-if there
are too many rights-holders in something, it (and usually Heller is
speaking of property of some kind) can no longer be managed efficiently. 9
Thus, with families, outside involvement benefits everyone up to a point, the
point at which the third party claims a legal right to be involved. At that
point, for functional reasons, the balance tips, and the greater the right to
intrude claimed, the more devastating it is to the family.
of Williams v. Williams, 485 S.E.2d 651 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that couples' analyst
advised them to gain some psychological distance from the grandparents). Compare the
alleged interference of these cases with that suffered at the hands of religious groups that
forms the background of O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693 (Idaho 1986) and Bear v.
Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1975). See generally JUDITH S.
WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE. THE GOOD MARRIAGE: HOW AND WHY LOVE LASTS 27
(1992) (listing as the first of nine psychological tasks that must be mastered to produce a
happy marriage "To separate emotionally from the family of one's childhood so as to invest
fully in the marriage and, at the same time, to redefine the lines of connection with both
families of origin.").
7. My oldest daughter was recently stymied in her attempts to help her Indian-
American best friend 'Ritu' when the friend's mother died suddenly. Ritu's family had been
cut off from their Indian extended family because they were a "love match," and Ritu,
because thoroughly Americanized, did not know the appropriate burial rituals.
8. Think in terms also of the Korean kye, or rotating credit association, or the money
other immigrants save to allow them to send back for relatives in the "old world." They may
be a funding device as well as insurance for bad times.
9. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Michael A. Heller, The
Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy
of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, I I HARV. L. REV.
621 (1998).
1, perhaps even more than Justice O'Connor in Troxel, am certainly not claiming that
children are property (though that may be the way other commentators here treat the opinion).
She wrote that "contrary to Justice Stevens' accusation, our description of state nonparental
visitation statutes in these terms, of course, is not meant to suggest that 'children are so much
chattel."' Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000).
2001]
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II. WAYS IN WHICH MARRIAGE AND PARENTS ENHANCE COMMUNITIES
We know, as legal and social science students of the family, that
marriages and families are societies' essential building blocks. 10 Parenting
is as important as marriage from society's and the child's perspective, and
interference with it is a threat to be avoided. For example, the Supreme
Court of Alabama, opining in Kilgrow v. Kilgrow,11 a dispute between two
parents over religious or public education for their child, noted that:
[I]ntervention, rather than preventing or healing a disruption, would quite
likely serve as the spark to a smoldering fire. A mandatory court decree
supporting the position of one parent against the other would hardly be a
composing situation for the unsuccessful parent to be confronted with daily.
One spouse could scarcely be expected to entertain a tender, affectionate
regard for the other spouse who brings him or her under restraint. The
judicial mind and conscience is repelled by the thought of disruption of the
sacred marital relationship, and usually voices the hope that the breach may
somehow be healed by mutual understanding between the parents
themselves.
John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government,12 reveals that as a
political matter, the "right to discipline" belongs not to parents, but to
10. See JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE 1789 (Ch. II: Guardian and
Ward):
Under whatever point of view the institution of marriage is considered, the utility of
this noble contract is striking. It is the bond of society, the foundation of civilization
.... Marriage, considered as a contract, has drawn women from the hardest and most
humiliating servitude; it has distributed the mass of the community into distinct
families; it has created a domestic magistracy; it has trained up citizens; it has
extended the views of men to the future, through their affection for the rising
generation; it has multiplied the social sympathies. In order to estimate all its
benefits, it is only necessary to imagine, for a moment, what would be the condition
of Man without the institution.
See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating that marriage "is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions"); Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888) (stating that marriage "is an institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress"); See generally Lee
E. Teitelbaum, Placing the Family in Context, 22 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 801 (1989) (stressing
the role families play in communities).
11. 107 So. 2d 885, 889 (Ala. 1958).
12. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT Ch. VI. § 67 (1690):
736 [Vol. 32:733
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children. As many of the papers in this symposium note, this theoretical
allocation of limited 13 power, however, has thus far not mustered a majority
of the Supreme Court.
III. WAYS IN WHICH COMMUNITIES ENHANCE MARRIAGE AND PARENTING
A. Sources of Information About the Relationships
Our social networks educate us about our relationships. There is
obviously a continuum between the proverbial locker room conversation
about sexual exploits and the hopefully more useful things parents teach
children about dispute resolution, childbearing and childrearing, and
manners. 14 Much of this education goes on before we begin grownup
relationships, but parents remain sources of support and guidance long after
children become adults. 15 Grandparents and others in the wider community
For, to speak properly of them, the first of these is rather the privilege of children,
and duty of parents, than any prerogative of paternal power. The nourishment and
education of their children is a charge so incumbent on parents for their children's
good that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it. And though the power of
commanding and chastising them go along with it, yet God hath woven into the
principles of human nature such a tenderness for their offspring that there is little fear
that parents should use their power with too much rigour; the excess is seldom on the
severe side, the strong bias of nature drawing the other way.
13. Id. at Ch. VI, § 67. Compare JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE
1789 (Ch. III: Guardian and Ward):
This power of protection and of government, over individuals thought incapable to
protect and to govern themselves, constitutes wardship, a kind of domestic
magistracy, founded upon the manifest need of those who are submitted to it, and
which ought to include all the powers necessary to the fulfillment of its object, and
nothing more.
14. Much of this information is positive, but unfortunately it can be negative as well.
Thus, patterns of child abuse are apparently frequently transmitted through the generations.
For a few recent examples of the literature, see Jocelyn Brown et al., A Longitudinal Analysis
of Risk Factors for Child Maltreatment: Findings of a 17- Year Prospective Study of Officially
Recorded and Self-Reported Child Abuse and Neglect, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1065
(1998); David DiLillo et al., Linking Childhood Sexual Abuse and Abusing Parenting: The
Mediating Role of Maternal Anger, 24 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 767 (2000); Jonathan V.
Kotch et al., Predicting Child Maltreatment in the First 4 Years of Life from Characteristics
Assessed, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 305 (1999). Some older accounts include ELIANA GIL,
OUTGROWING THE PAIN: A BOOK FOR AND ABOUT ADULTS ABUSED AS CHILDREN (New York,
1988); ALICE MILLER, THOU SHALT NOT BE AWARE: SOCIETY'S BETRAYAL OF THE CHILD (1st
ed. 1984).
15. In September, my post-graduate daughter called me wanting advice on how to
approach a group for which she'd been asked to give a talk. Her current love interest is a
2001]
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also provide cultural guidelines within which to pursue relationships, as well
as experience about relationships that last. This type of help is particularly
evident in African-American and first generation American communities.16
Sometimes such information passing is more formalized. In some religious
traditions and for those electing covenant marriage in Arizona and
Louisiana, couples are required to attend marriage preparation classes.
Sometimes clergy gives these, while other times, they are held by groups of
engaged or married couples from the relevant tradition. Generally speaking,
this more formalized community involvement is designed to continue during
marriage as well.
B. Investment
Historically, many families seeking to immigrate to this country have
sent a potential high earner along first to establish himself (most often) and
then pay for the others' passage. 17 Such investments by families can also be
made by the wider community. In the business and corporate world, much
has been made of the ability of new Asian immigrants to the United States to
pool assets and earnings to establish an investment fund from which all
members can draw. 18 Observers have credited much of the success of the
small businesses run by first generation Asian Americans to such
cooperative financial support (along, of course, with the tremendous
industry of the individuals involved). 19
C. Insurance
Marriage often serves an insurance function. 20 If a marriage contains
two potential labor force participants, one can work if the other becomes
member of this group, and the topic she was considering could have alienated him.
16. For a recent fictional example, see NANCY RING, WALKING ON WALNUTS (1996), a
memoir about a Jewish-American woman growing up and her extended family. Ms. Ring
equated much of the information passing with stories and recipes, ways in which I certainly
learned volumes from my grandmothers.
17. For a recent account, see FRANK MCCOURT, 'Tis (1999).
18. For a fictional account, see AmY TAN, THE JOY LUCK CLUB (1989).
19. These financial institutions, and those in many other cultures, are reviewed
extensively in Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996). They will be
discussed at greater length in the law and economics of norms section of this paper.
20. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1225 (1998).
[Vol. 32:733
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unemployed or unemployable. Historically, couples might have many
children to insure that at least some of them could support their parents in
old age or carry on the family name.2 1 In day-to-day life, many parents will
rely on each other's availability to do chauffeuring and other childcare tasks
if a child gets ill or there is a "snow day" from school. One of my Indian-
American students has told me that the wedding ring she wears, which is a
wavy circlet in the Hindu tradition, signifies each spouse's duty not only to
weather hard times but to help pull the other back to a more central path. 22
Parents rely upon the wider community as well. From the frontier 23 or
Amish family's shared barn building24 to the 1960s "coffee klatches, ' '25
other families, and especially other women, have long provided support for
each other. Whether it was an additional hand in hard work, help when
someone was sick, child-rearing advice, or just a shared recipe, the broader
community has always taken an interest in strengthening the family. In a
more organized vein, such insurance-type functions may be typical of job-
sharing between two mothers (or two spouses) in the paid labor force. 26
21. Hence the Chinese wedding blessing, "May You be the Mother of a Hundred
Sons!"
22. Compare Ira Lupu, Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1317 (1994) (stating husbands and wives act to eliminate each others' worst
childrearing practices).
23. Such shared tasks were generally a striking feature of the work of LAURA INGALLS
WILDER, LrrLE HOUSE BOOKS. See also PRAIRIE VOICES: IOWA'S PIONEER WOMEN (Glenda
Riley ed., 1996); HERB PLAMBECK, IOWA'S HERITAGE OF PIONEER FAMILY FARMS (1996-97);
GLENDA RILEY, THE FEMALE FRONTIER: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE PRAIRIE AND THE
PLAINS 81 (1988); JANE SMILEY, THE ALL TRUE ADVENTURES AND TRAVELS OF LIDDIE
NEWTON (1999).
24. See, e.g., the movie WrrNESS (Paramont Pictures 1985).
25. Neighborhood women would apparently gather for coffee after getting their families
off for the day and fi,ishing their morning chores. My older friends tell me that these
informal meetings settled many a family dispute and helped divide up work from picking up
children at carpools to harvesting vegetable gardens.
26. A recent survey by the AFL-CIO noted that "nearly half of all women who are
married or living with someone (46 percent) say they work a different schedule from their
spouses or domestic partners. Among married women with young children, the figure rises to
51 percent." Working Women Working Together, at
http://www.aflcio.org/women/surveyl.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2000). According to their
Website, "[d]uring 1999, the AFL-CIO Working Women's Department hosted 5,000 group
discussions in kitchens, workplaces, conference rooms and town halls around the country." In
January 2000, the AFL-CIO followed up with a scientific survey of a large and nationally
representative random sample of working women 18 and older." Id.
2001]
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D. Dispute Resolution and Venting
When we've had rough days at the job, whether outside or inside the
home, or at school, our families, and particularly our spouses and parents,
provide helpful ears for our venting. Social science support for what may
seem a common sense proposition is quite extensive. In fact, a recent
paper27 both reviews the literature and establishes a new point--even in
marriages of more than fourteen years, relationship-specific support
significantly predicted more stable and successful marriages, while friends
in common and general personal support did not.28
Our children vent, too. They tell us (and especially their siblings) about
fights on the playground, the teacher's or the "populars"' 29 latest classroom
antics, and their distress at missing the last spot on the varsity team. If we
have particularly close relationships with them, they may report to us the
anguish of being date-raped or the sadness of breaking up with their
girlfriend or boyfriend. Cultivating this close sharing with our children may
be the most important thing we do 30 after donating our DNA. It of course
means sharing (appropriately) some of our own mistakes and regrets and
failures around the dinner table or in a rare moment of no distractions from
phone, TV, or internet chatrooms.
Mutual support is at least part of what Milton C. Regan, Jr. celebrates in
Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy.31 One of the home qualities
promoted by the "Separate Spheres" doctrine of the nineteenth century was
the ability of the peaceful and clean home to cleanse the worker, tired and at
least figuratively dirty from his day earning money. 32 Thus we complain to
27. Chalandra M. Bryant & Rand D. Conger, Marital Success and Domains of Social
Support in Long-Term Relationships: Does the Influence of Network Members Ever End ? 61
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 437 (1999).
28. Id. at 447. Not only did relationship-specific support show the strongest association
with marital success for both husbands and wives; but also it was the only significant
predictor.
29. My high school sophomore daughter says her class is divided among the "populars"
and the "regulars." The "populars" are exclusive; the "regulars" (like her) are not. The
"regulars" would like to be as admired by the young men in the class as the "populars," and
are very concerned when the others have dates and they do not.
30. See JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION: WHY CHILDREN TURN OUT
THE WAY THEY Do (1998) (reporting that peers, rather than parents, have the most important
influence on children's success, once genetic endowments are taken into account).
31. MILTON C. REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE RESULT OF INTIMACY (1993).
32. See, e.g., CATHARINE E. BEECHER & HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, THE AMERICAN
WOMAN'S HOME 17-20 (1869); MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY
IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865, at 41(1981).
[Vol. 32:733
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our families about people and events from outside. We also use our families
to resolve disputes we have with each other. When our parents teach us
about how to forgive our siblings or our parents, or how to admit blame for
our mistakes, we are better able to do the same with outsiders.
On a broader basis, communities can also function to resolve disputes,
sometimes much more effectively than the civil or criminal justice system.
Professor Lawrence Sherman has recently studied dispute resolution for
juvenile offenders in New Zealand, 33 and reports that when the offender and
his or her chosen supporters meet with the victim and supporters, true
healing occurs.34 A neutral third party, usually a police officer, asks both
sides to report what happened. The offender almost always admits
responsibility and the victim forgives. There is some direct restitution,
which may come from the offender or his family and may be in kind rather
than simply financial. At least in New Zealand, this process has been much
more successful in lowering recidivism than has the public justice system.35
Of course, as Linda Kerber reminds me (and I have written myself), the Separate Spheres
doctrine produced all sorts of obstacles to women's progress. See, e.g., LINDA K. KERBER, No
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITzENSHIP (1998);
WOMEN's AMERICA: REFOCUSING THE PAST (Linda K. Kerber & Jane Sheron DeHart eds., 5th
ed. 2000); and particularly, June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage:
Feminist Ideology, Economic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 967-73
(1991); Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1579-
84 (1994); Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric
of Women's History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9, 20-21 (1988). For other critical accounts, see JEANNE
BOYDSTON, HOME & WORK: HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC 140-41 (1990); CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN
AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 26-29 (1980); MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN
AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 191-93 (1986).
33. Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing Domestic Violence: An Evidence Based Strategy, 5
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. (2001).
34. An example of restorative justice is Mike Kilen, A Murder Victim's Son Remembers
and Forgives: Davenport Case Takes an Odd Turn, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 13, 2000, at Al.
See also John Braithwaite & Kathleen Daly, Masculinities, Violence and Communitarian
Control, in JUST BOYS DOING BUSINESS? MEN, MASCULINITIEs, AND CRIME 189, 192-96 (Tim
Newburn & Elizabeth A. Stanko eds., 1994) (explaining that community group conferencing
borrows in part from indigenous justice practices); Frederick W.M. McElrea, The New
Zealand Youth Court: A Model for Use with Adults, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 69 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996).
35. Sherman was earlier a leading advocate of mandatory arrest in domestic violence
cases. See Lawrence W. Sherman & Douglas A. Smith, Crime, Punishment, and Stake in




Such a practice has an older analog in the Native American peacemaker
court. The Native American community began the Navajo Peacemaker
Court in 1982 because the civil state courts were contrary to Navajo
tradition. 36 In contrast, "one goes out of the courtroom with his tail up, and
the other goes out with his tail down." 37 Navajo philosophy centers around
the concept of hozh6--everything is in its proper place and functioning in
harmonious relationship to everything else,38 and K'e-all those positive
virtues which constitute intense, diffuse, and enduring solidarity. 39
Traditional Indian justice involves the perpetrator and the victim directly
"talking out" the problem, along with involving their family and clans. For
example, in domestic violence situations, the Peacemaker Court would
restore the victim to her former self-back into her state of hozh6, and the
perpetrator, with the assistance of his family and clan, do the restoring.40
A pertinent question though is whether this system works for the
Navajos because the Native American community is relatively small and
homogeneous, 41 or whether it works because the community is personally
involved in the justice system. The relationship between the dramatic New
Zealand and Navajo nation findings on restorative justice and the much less
positive ones done by Straus and Gelles on mandatory arrest4 2 is that both
involved the status-prior to and after the offense-of the offender in the
community. When the extended family and friends are involved in the
proceedings, the offender can maintain dignity and feelings of self-worth,
feel supported, and explain his or her side of the story. He is much less
likely to repeat the offense. More broadly speaking, the salutary results
36. For a complete account, see Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered
Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1999).
37. Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes from It": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV.
175, 178 & n.22 (1993).
38. James W. Zion & Elsie B. Zion, Hozho' Sokee'-Stay Together Nicely: Domestic
Violence Under Navajo Common Law, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 407, 415 (1993).
39. James W. Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of
Conquest. 20 B.C. INT'D & COMP. L. REV. 55, 76-77 (1997).
40. See Coker, supra note 36, at 45-46 ("First, the abuser or his family or both may
agree to provide nalyeeh (reparations) in the form of money, goods, or personal services for
the victim. Nalyeeh is a concrete recognition that the harm of battering is real] and that
responsibility for it extends beyond the individual batterer.").
41. A visiting colleague from New Zealand who specializes in Maori law reports less
success as indigenous peoples move to cities. Interview with Andrew Erueti, Victoria
University, Wellington (July 2000).
42. See, e.g., Murray Straus & Richard J. Gelles, The Costs Of Family Violence, 102
PUB. HEALTH REPORTS 638 (Nov./Dec. 1987).
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occur precisely because the community becomes involved with the
relationship.
The tribal court successes suggest an answer to the question whether
community involvement will lessen given the growing rate of childlessness
and smaller families generally. The tribal court results have nothing to do
with the presence of children (and the New Zealand replications involve
youthful offenders with no children.43) The community interest may not,
therefore, exist primarily to benefit (and encourage the production of)
children, and may be strong even for childless marriages.
Communities handle family conflicts in many ways that extend beyond
the domestic violence setting. The current interest in community
involvement with parenting can be demonstrated in the popularity of the
book It Takes a Village.44 Legislation of some states,45 and the writing of
some commentators, 46 suggest different divorce regimes for marriages
without minor children. Others47 suggest protection of the children of
divorce by giving them the marital estate or some share in it. Some states
extend parental support to include college education for children of
divorce. 48 The "Open Adoption" movement49 and the recent legislation
43. See generally JOHN A. BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989);
Sherman & Smith, supra note 35.
44. Clinton, supra note 5 (advocating community support for families to ensure
children's well-being).
45. Virginia and Tennessee have different waiting periods for those divorcing on no-
fault grounds with and without children. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(3) (requiring in a
"irreconcilable differences" divorce, a ninety 4ay-from-filing waiting period if there are
children; sixty days if not); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (requiring six months separation for
those without children; one year with minor children and a separation agreement).
46. See, e.g., ALLEN W. PARKMAN. No-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1992);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9
(1990).
47. Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980s, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553 (1984);
Judith T. Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on the American Family, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 891 (1992).
48. For two relatively recent constitutional challenges to state statutes that reach
opposite conclusions, see Crocker v. Crocker, 971 P.2d 469 (Or. 1998) (finding a rational
basis for requiring payment for college education only from divorced parents); Curtis v.
Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995) (holding that it violates equal protection to require college
education support only of divorced parents).
49. See generally, LINCOLN CAPLAN, AN OPEN ADOPTION (1990); RUTH G. McRoY ET
AL., OPENNESS IN ADOPTION, NEW PRACTICES, NEW ISSUES (1988); Carol M. Amadio & Stuart
L. Deutsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children to 'Stay in Touch' with Blood
Relatives, 22 J. FAM. L. 59 (1983-84); Laurie A. Ames, Open Adoptions: Truth and
Consequences, 16 L. & PSYCH. REV. 137 (1992); Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Open
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allowing more access to information identifying birth parents,50 when
looked at from the perspective of the adopted child, show a desire by the
child to establish his or her roots in the community.
E. Conventions and Behavior Channeling
As mentioned above, spouses and families and the wider community are
useful in establishing morals, or, more broadly, culture. As children, we may
learn acceptable ways of dealing with older people. 51 In fact, one group of
economists claims that parents use their own behavior to their parents
specifically to indicate to their children how they wish to be treated when
they become aged and dependent.52 We learn how to act as social beings in
our own ethnic groups. Thus, some of the opposition to inter-racial adoption
has been on grounds that African-American children need to be educated not
only about African traditions and history, but also how to fortify themselves
against a racist society. 53 Parents and the wider community also teach
Adoption, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 316 (David Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter
eds., 1990); Nancy E. Dowd, A Feminist Analysis of Adoption, 107 HARV. L. REV. 913, 931
(1994).
50. See, e.g., Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Roger B.,
418 N.E.2d 751 (111. 1981); see also JOSEPH J. CULLIGAN, ADOPTION SEARCHES MADE EASIER
(1996): LYNN C. FRANKLIN, MAY THE CIRCLE BE UNBROKEN: AN INTIMATE JOURNEY INTO THE
HEART OF ADOPTION (1998); Lois LOWRY, FIND A STRANGER, SAY GOODBYE (1978).
51. Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Thinking, 101 J. POL. ECON. 205 (1993)
(discussing guilt); see also LOCKE, supra note 12, at 33 (stating that "a perpetual obligation of
honouring their parents . . .engages him in all actions of defence, relief, assistance, and
comfort of those by whose means he entered into being").
52. Donald Cox & Oded Stark, Intergenerational Transfers and the Demonstration
Effect (1998) (Department of Economics, Boston College).
53. For a recent discussion, see David Crary, Interracial Adoption Debate Plagues
Family, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, July 3, 2000, at B20 (2000 WL 9351525) (reporting that The
National Association of Black Social Workers "shares a yearning to get black children out of
foster care. But it says the priority should be to place them with black families who have a
better understanding of racism and black culture."). See also In re Adoption No. 12612, 725
A.2d 1037 (Md. Ct. App. 1999); Arlo Wagner, Pixley Loses Custody, THE WASH. TIMES, Jan
12, 2000. The judge thought Mrs. Blankman "does not have a sufficient understanding about
Comilous' black race." The judge explained, Simply being 'colorblind' or feeling you are a
person who is not conscious of the racial difference is not enough, Judge Scrivener said,
adding that Cornilous needs to understand the "significance and learn the pride in his race" as
he grows older. For some older contributions, see Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption:
Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 517 (1984); Twila L.
Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordination,
21 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 33 (1993-94). Thus, while book learning and exposure
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children about law, respect for law, and limits they should set for their own
behavior.54
For marriages, culture in this sense includes such mundane items as
whether, and in what way, to celebrate one's anniversary (hence the lists of
gifts, beginning with paper and ending with diamonds), 55 Valentine's Day,
or Father's Day. More importantly, conventions and behavior channeling
include expectations about the duration of marriage, what justifies leaving
one's spouse or divorcing, 56 what kind of conduct is acceptable, what kind
is cruel. We know, for example, that in places where there are more births to
unwed parents or more divorces-in other words, a culture of single
parenting or divorce-more occur even holding other explanatory variables
constant.57 Conversely, where there is a culture or tradition of extramarital
chastity and lifetime marriages, less of the more socially costly behavior
occurs.
F. Union-building
Community involvement in marriage can certainly be seen in courtship
rituals. Parents and other family members are, and always have been,
to museums and cultural centers might work for the first concern (history and traditions), it
will clearly not be up to the second challenge. This source of family and community
contribution provided the background for one of the early privacy cases upon which Troxel is
built. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 290 (1923) (involving German language instruction in a
community where German was the language spoken in many homes).
54. For a discussion of how children are taught trust and limits, see Jennifer Roback
Morse, The Development of the Child, Liberty Fund Symposium, The Family, The Person
and the State (1995) (George Mason University). For some of my empirical efforts along this
line, see Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley. The Price of Virtue, 98 PUBLIC CHOICE Ill
(1999).
55. A complete list appears at
http://www.wowpages.comlspecialmoments/wedding.html (visited on July 14, 2001).
56. Empirical research shows, for example, that the percentage of the population that
was divorced in the state where a person lived when sixteen (and in that year) predicts the age
at which one would marry (a higher divorce rate predicts an older age at first marriage) and
even how much education a woman would receive (a higher divorce rate predicts fewer
completed years of school). Research is based upon the National Survey of Families and
Households (NSFH) coupled with percentages of divorced persons found in the March
Current Population Survey (CPS). Statistics available from the author, working with Steven
L. Nock, Department of Sociology, University of Virginia.
57. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for
Walking": Why Mostly Wives File for Divorce, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126 (2000)




involved when relationships progress from the casual to the serious stage.58
Some religious groups still require something akin to the historical
publishing of banns 59 well before a couple can marry. Ceremonial marriage
requires a license 60 and the meeting of certain requirements involving
contractual capacity (age and mental capacity) 6 1 and what might be thought
of as social capacity (no continuing other marriage, no close family
relationship, and different genders). 62 The community is also vitally
involved in the marriage ceremony as necessary witnesses to the couple's
vows and also, particularly in the Jewish and covenant marriage contexts, as
guarantors of support. 63 Other examples can be drawn from the regulation
of ongoing marriages (for example, the necessaries doctrine 64 and
58. For an interesting description of the ancient Choctaws' courtship system, see W.B.
Morrison, Choctaw Marriage Customs-The Ancient Way, at
http://www.isd.net/mboucher/choctaw/marrl.htm (visited Jan. 14, 2001). That of the Zapotecs
in Mexico, where fathers may deny or give blessings, are described at
http://www.southmex.comlmexico/traditionsmarriagecustoms.html (visited Jan. 14, 2001).
At the website http://www.unam.mx/voices/1996/nov/guelague.html (visited Jan. 14, 2001),
the Guelaguetza festival is to honor "that spirit of service among men in the certainty that all
joys and all unhappiness belong to everyone at one time or another. Jos6 Antonio Gay says
the Guelaguetza is the aid the indigenous people offer each other freely at all the most
important moments of life: birth, death, the raising of a house and marriage." In Choson
(Korean) Confucian society, "marriage did not signify the formation of a new family. Instead,
marriage signified the extension of an existing family, namely, the husband's." YUNG-CHUNG
Kim, WOMEN OF KOREA: A HISTORY FROM ANCIENTTIMES TO 1945, at 89 (1979).
59. Banns are public announcements of the intent to marry.
60. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-14.2 (West 2000). Even in states that recognize common
law marriages, the preferred and much more common ceremonial form requires a license. See,
e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.3 (West 2000) ("Previous to the solemnization of any marriage,
a license for that purpose must be obtained from the clerk of the district court."). Marriages
without following statutory rules are nonetheless recognized under Iowa Code section 595.11
(2000).
61. See IOWA CODE § 595.1 ("Marriage is a civil contract, requiring the consent of the
parties capable of entering into other contracts, except as herein otherwise declared, and the
fairly typical Iowa Code Ann § 595.2 (requiring age of 18, except that minors between 16 and
18 may marry with parental consent with a judicial bypass provision of "consent has been
unreasonably withheld.").
62. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.19 (governing persons related by blood or who
have a living husband or wife).
63. For another and particularly vivid example, consider the Moroccan (Islamic)
traditions described in M.E. COMBS-SCHILLING, SACRED PERFORMANCES 198-205 (1989),
where through a number of processions, visits to a spring, and finally gun play, the
bridegroom joins the elder generation of men, symbolically reestablishing the Muslim
community.
64. See generally Sheryl L. Scheible, Defining "Support" Under the Bankruptcy Law:
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prohibitions against contracts that contradict the essence of marriage). 65 Of
course there are rules involving the exit from marriage (divorce grounds
and, for example, the required viewing by divorcing couples of films on the
effect of divorce on children). 66
We do significant community-building with our children as well. 67 In
Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy,68 Milton Regan mentions the
rituals that hold us together as families. This particularly includes family
holidays such as -Thanksgiving, the Seder meal, and Christmas. 69 All of
these include "outside" traditions-turkey, football and cranberry sauce,
lamb, specific prayers and bitter herbs, and decorated trees, nativity scenes
and carols-and other special customs that run within particular families.
Such traditions give us a sense of shared identity and help support the unity
necessary to foster family cooperation on harder questions. 70
G. The Central Place of Religion in Relationships, or "The family that
prays together, stays together. "71
Many of my earlier observations might suggest a linkage between the
community involvement (particularly outside the nuclear family) and
religion. Obviously religious authorities can perform marriage ceremonies
(and in some countries this is exclusively true). Marriages "in" a religion
can subject couples to a set of ecclesiastical rules as well as the secular
ones. 72 Certainly there are strong marriages that are not part of a religious
tradition. Data suggests, however, that Catholics and fundamentalist
Protestants, for example, divorce at about the same rate (or higher) as does
Revitalization of the "Necessaries" Doctrine, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1988).
65. See, e.g., In re Higgason's Marriage, 516 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1973); Favrot v. Barnes,
332 So. 2d 873 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Matthews v. Matthews, 162 S.E.2d 697 (N.C. Ct. App.
1968); Cumming v. Cumming, 102 S.E. 572 (Va. 1920).
66. The legislation is collected at <http://www.divorcereform.org>.
67. See Margaret F. Brinig, The Family Franchise: Elderly Parents and Adult Siblings,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 393, 404-05.
68. See REGAN, supra note 31.
69. Id. at 26-27 (citing STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A
SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 48 (1988)).
70. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Laws and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
5(1985).
71. This slogan, whose origin is unknown, appeared on numerous bumper stickers in
the 1970s.
72. For example, Catholics must obtain ecclesiastical annulments before they can
remarry. Orthodox Jewish women need to obtain their husband's get. See, e.g., Avitzur v.
Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983).
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the general public. 73 If this is so, is it strong religious tradition or personal
adherence that is important in maintaining marital stability?
Most studies find that the stated religious preference at the time of
marriage has very little effect on marital stability. 74 Two Methodists
marrying, holding other things constant, will divorce about as often as two
Catholics, two Jews, or two atheists. Steven Nock and I wondered whether it
might not be religious intensity rather than affiliation that was important.
We found, using the National Survey of Families and Households, that
difference in religious observance and the importance of God in one's life
did affect the couple's ability to stay together over the period in question.
Our unpublished work to a large extent duplicated that of B.Y.U.
sociologists who used the same data set.75 Call and Heaton found that when
both spouses attend religious services regularly, the couple has the lowest
risk of divorce, while difference in church attendance increase the risk of
divorce. 76 They posit that church attendance "can either provide a common
forum for a couple's religious orientation and family commitment or
become a conflict for couples who do not share the same levels of personal
dedication." 77 They note that joint participation in church gives a family a
sense of purpose and similar values that increase family commitment and
social integration. 78 However, the Call and Heaton study found (as did we)
that all significant religious affiliation influences disappear once the authors
controlled for demographic differences. Call and Heaton continued to find
significant results in cases where the spouses differed in church activities,
because "joint socialization in religious teachings that support family values
and stability affirm the importance of marriage and family," and "joint
73. See Maja Beckstrom, Pollster's Data Tell Churches How Their Believers Behave,
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Aug. 17, 1996, at 16A.
74. Vaughn R.A. Call & Tim B. Heaton, Religious Influence on Marital Stability, 36 J.
SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 382 (1997); see, e.g., Theresa Castro-Martin & Larry
Bumpass, Recent Trends in Marital Disruption, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 37-52 (1990); Tim B.
Heaton & Edith L. Pratt, The Effects of Religious Homogamy on Marital Satisfaction and
Stability, II J. FAM. ISS. 191-207 (1990); Paul Nakonezy et al., The Effect of No-Fault
Divorce Law on the Divorce Rates Across the 50 States and Its Relation to Income, Education
and Religiosity, 57 J. MARRIAGE AND THE FAM. 477-88 (1995); George Gallo & Jim Castelli,
Attitudes on Marriage Surveyed, Catholic, Protestant Divorce Rates Similar, WASH. POST,
April 8, 1989 at C13.
75. Call & Heaton, supra note 74.
76. Id. at 386-87.
77. Id. at 383.
78. Id. at 391 (citing Walter R. Schumm, Beyond Relationship Characteristics of
Strong Families: Constructing a Model of Family Strengths, 19 FAMILY PERSPECTIVE 1
(1985)).
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participation in friendship networks provides a greater potential for
interaction with friends in a context that generally supports positive
communication between spouses." 79
Religious tradition also suggests more than does civil law80 that children
should be respectful towards their parents8' and should support them in old
age.82 These would certainly seem to be positive, community-building, and
supportive features of families. 83 But religious tradition may also be
mutated into allowing an over-disciplinary father and a pious, noninterfering
mother.84
79. Call & Heaton, supra note 74, at 391.
80. Margaret F. Brinig, Finite Horizons: The American Family, 2 INT'L. J. CHILDREN'S
RTS. 293 (1994) (detailing laws requiring support of aged parents and the relationship
between treatment of children and aged parents living in the home).
81: See e.g., Exodus 20:12 (proclaiming the fourth of Ten Commandments).
82. Both the Old Testament books of Exodus and Leviticus and the New Testament
parables and epistles stress the need to support the elderly widow and orphan, see, e.g.,
Deutesonomy 24:19-21; Job 24:21; Timothy 5:3-8, and the duty to support one's own aged
parents, Exodus 20:12; Leviticus 20:9; Leviticus 19:3; Ephesians 6:1.
83. The facts that the Amish did not use public welfare and were exempted from Social
Security because of their community's self-sufficiency were noted by the Court in Wisconsin
ov. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972) ("Its members are productive and very law-abiding
members of society; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modem forms. The
Congress itself recognized their self-sufficiency by authorizing exemption of such groups as
the Amish from the obligation to pay social security taxes.").
84. For two recent fictional additions to this literature, see M. ANNETTE ANSAY,
VINEGAR HILL (1994) and SISTER (1997). The negative effects of extreme religiosity have
become one of the stereotypical characteristics of the battered woman and the abused child.
See Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing a successful § 1983 suit
against a social worker who stripped searched a child on the basis of an anonymous tip by a
neighbor who reported hearing a child crying "No, Daddy" and who noted that the
Calabrettas were "extremely religious" and home-schooled their children). For other cases see
O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693 (Idaho 1986) (ruling upon successful alienation of
affections case against clergy and others involved with Fatima Crusade); Michigan v.
Yarborough, 384 N.W.2d 107 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (finding "prophet" killed boy by beating
him with stick for not working, and testified that he had to do so because of the strictures of
Deuteronomy 21:18); Spires v. Spires, 743 A.2d 184 (D.C. 1999) (finding that, apparently,
the Spires's marriage had not been doing well. They signed a contract in which the minister
husband agreed "to continue in this marriage" in exchange for numerous promises from his
wife. She agreed to "conduct herself in accordance with all scriptures in the Holy Bible
applicable to marital relationships germane to wives, and in accordance with husband's
specific requests." The agreement, which was incredibly one-sided, was invalidated by the
appellate court.). See also JAMES ALSDURF & PHYLLIS ALSDURF, BATrERED INTO SUBMISSION:
THE TRAGEDY OF WIFE ABUSE IN THE CHRISTIAN HOME 10, 16-17 (1989); MARGARET L.
BEDROTH, FUNDAMENTALISM AND GENDER: 1875 TO THE PRESENT 116 (1993) (reporting on
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A study by the George Barna research group 85 found that "Born-Again"
Christians are slightly more likely to divorce than the average American
(with rates of 27 as opposed to 23 percent of a group of more than 3,000
randomly selected adults). A more recent Associated Press article published
statistics showing that the so-called Bible Belt states had higher divorce
rates than the national average. 86 Although this piece noted that Protestants
seem to divorce more often than Catholics, the difference seems to be
decreasing. 87  (Remarriage for Catholics happens less frequently,
however.)88
One reason religious homogeneity may be important is that it increases
attachment to the community in which the couple lives. Home ownership
apparently increases marital stability, while living in a large metropolitan
area, whether in a suburb or central city, decreases it. 89 In an earlier work,
Frank Buckley and I found that divorce rates from 1979 to 1991 were higher
both in metropolitan areas90 and in "frontier" states. 91
Christian fundamentalist (Protestant and Catholic) emphasis on women's self-sacrifice and
the glorification of their suffering and victimization make women particularly vulnerable to
accepting battering relationships); see also Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs
and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 465 (1992).
Generally, such abuse is common in families with rigid sex roles and gross inequities in
power distribution. See ALSDURF & ALSDURF, supra, at 17; DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL.,
COMMON FEATURES OF FAMILY ABUSE, IN THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY
VIOLENCE RESEARCH 17, 19 (1983).
85. See Beckstrom, supra note 73.
86. Bible Belt States Struggling With Divorce, IOWA CITY PRESS-CrrIZEN, Nov. 13,
1999, at 7A.
87. The divorce rate for Catholics in the Barna survey was 21%. However, for younger
Catholics, their upbringing had no effect on the rate of divorce. William Sander, Catholicism
and Marriage in the United States, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 373 (1993). Mormon couples married in
the church had a divorce rate of 13% according to a 1993 article appearing in Demography.
Bob Mims, Stats Show Mormons Buck Secularization, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, March 6,
1999.
88. See, e.g., Barbara F. Wilson & Sally C. Clarke, Remarriages: A Demographic
Profile. 13 J. FAM. ISS. 123 (1992).
89. Scott J. South & Glenna Spitze, Determinants of Divorce over the Marital Life
Course, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 583, 589 (1986).
90. Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, No Fault Laws and At-Fault People, 18 INT'L
REV. OF L. & ECON. 325, 336 (1998); see also RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER 452
(1988) (reporting that social ties are generally less strong in urban areas, partly because social
support groups, which enforce social norms, are weaker); Sara S. McLanahan & Irwin
Garfinkel, Single Mothers, The Underclass, and Social Policy, 501 ANNALS, AAPSS 92
(1989). See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990); James S.
Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY S95
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IV. EVIDENCE OF THE POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARRIAGE AND
COMMUNITY
I have been exceptionally fortunate in reading the stories of many
students who have shared with me something of their lives and their
families. Two in particular have written about arranged marriages in
twentieth-century America. 92 One, a second-generation Indian-American,
sent me an exceptionally moving and interesting account of her own
arranged marriage. Not surprisingly, as an American-educated and very
Americanized young person, she was skeptical that her parents could find
someone right for her. Surprisingly, she fell in love with the man she was to
marry after her first year in law school, though she became acquainted with




91. Brinig & Buckley, supra note 90, at 335, 337 & Table 5. Our tables use the variable
Entry to measure this effect.
92. Not all arranged marriage forms seem more successful than love matches. A study
of divorce rates in China using a 1985 survey sample from two provinces and the
municipality of Shanghai, covering more than 13,307 women, found that the arranged
marriages ended in divorce more than twice as often as so called "free choice" marriages.
Cailian Lio & Tim B. Heaton, Divorce Trends and Differentials in China, 23 J. COMPARATIVE
FAM. STUDIES 413, 422 (1992). As one might predict, instability was highest for those women
who were older than 25 when they married in arranged marriages. See id. at 426. (The divorce
rate in China is miniscule compared to U.S. standards, and was about .0016 for those
surveyed who were educated seven or more years, even lower for those with less education.).
The Chinese apparently date following the commitment to marry rather than before, and
know each other for longer before marriage than their American counterparts, regardless of
marriage type. See id. at 417 (citing M.K. WHYTE & W. PARISH, URBAN LIFE IN
CONTEMPORARY CHICAGO (1984)). The Liao and Heaton article contains a useful discussion
of the traditional Chinese attitudes about marriage and the importance of family; see also Xu
Xziaohe & Martin King Whyte, Love Matches and Arranged Marriages: A Chinese
Replication, 52 J. MARR. & FAM. 709, 715-720 (1990) (finding that the incidence of, and
couple's satisfaction with, arranged marriage decreased dramatically over the past 60 years.
Wives especially are more satisfied in love matches).
For a relatively sympathetic account of Korean arranged marriages, see LAURA
KENDALL, GETTING MARRIED IN KOREA: OF GENDER, MORALITY, AND MODERNITY 85-115
(1996).
93. Subana Rai, Paper for Perspectives in the Individual, the Family, and the Social
Institutions, Fall 1998 (on file with author).
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However, deep down, I had always harbored secret thoughts of doubt
about arranged marriages. My parents had a great marriage, but I had also
observed some unhappy Indian couples. I knew that just because a marriage
is arranged does not guarantee that it would work. Another problem with
arranged marriages is that there is an immense social stigma to ending that
marriage in divorce. Even today, Indian couples rarely choose that course of
action, regardless of abuse or other serious marital problems.9 4
On balance, she thinks they are more successful than many of their Western
counterparts.
There are numerous benefits of arranged marriages that may not always exist
in the "love" marriage. The marriage is generally not based on fleeting
sexual desires. I believe this is one of primary reasons arranged marriages
are more stable than love marriages. The husband and the wife will have
similar religious backgrounds, family friends, and cultural values to rely on
if their marriage is having problems. In addition, both the husband and
wife's families are very supportive of the marriage because they were the
ones who arranged it. An arranged marriage is not just a union between a
husband and his wife, but also a union between two families. 9 5
94. Id.
95. For a recent account found on the Internet, see Bala Swaminathan, Love Match and
Arranged Marriage, http://www.cs.wustl.edu/-bs/essays/marriages.html. See also Yasmin
Alibhai-Borwn, Marriage of Minds Not Hearts, 6 NEw STATESMAN AND SOC'Y 28 (1993).
Alibhai-Brown's description is a bit different from my student's, for she says that "[o]nce
vetted, it is left to the individual to make the final choice. The couple can get to know each
other, and there is no coercion. The woman has the final say. As parents get increasingly
worried about losing their children in this society, they are ever more anxious not to
pressurise [sic] them." Id. Accounts of older Indian traditions can be found in CHANCHAL
KUMAR CHATrERJEE, STUDIES IN THE RITES AND RITUALS OF HINDU MARRIAGE IN ANCIENT
INDIA (1978) (reporting that multiple wooers negotiate for the woman's hand); USHA M.
APTE, THE SACRAMENT OF MARRIAGE IN HINDU SOCIETY 37-39, 50-52 (1978).
The Song of the Groom's Anointment, or btauni, is sung in rural India when the
bridegroom is rubbed with saffron prior to his returning home. It illustrates the involvement
of the extended family in the successful union:
In a gold cup
I make the saffron paste
And rub it on the bridegroom's body
The Brahman utters prayers,
The women sing their joy.
The mother wipes his mouth with her sari
The father's sister pencils his eyes
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Similarly, a Navajo-American student wrote me:
From the second quarter of this century to the present, the tradition of
arranged marriages has been replaced in favor of allowing couples to choose
their own spouses. Interestingly, my own observation of the success of these
two different marriage processes-if success is measured in longevity-has
been that the arranged marriage survives longer than those based on
emotion. This does not suggest that an arranged marriage is without
affection, rather the initial decision of marriage is made by people whose
judgment is not "clouded" by the titillation of love.9 6
In the Navajo tradition,
[Miarriages were arranged between families, which included not only the
parents, but also grandparents, uncles, and aunts of the "husband to be and
wife to be." Furthermore, traditionally the bride and groom really did not
have a say as to who they would marry. Negotiations between the families
included what the groom's family would give to the bride's family ...
horses, sheep, cows, jewelry-a sort of dowry. A date for the ceremony was
chosen. More importantly, the clans of the couple were stated and approved
by the family to ensure against intermarriage. "The bloodlines were kept
clean and everyone was knowledgeable about the clanship system and the
whole society was kept in balance in that manner."
I wonder which of the traits my students identify as stabilizing is the
more important. They initially pointed to the lack of dependence on sexual
love and expectations of romance as why arranged marriages are so stable.
Perhaps, instead, it is the qualities of community support, interrelatedness,
and approval that they also mention that really make the difference.
Many of us are most familiar with another incarnation of arranged
marriage-the early nineteenth century Russian-Jewish tradition that we
The elder brother's wife fans his head,
The women sing their joy.
The father's brother's wife wipes his mouth
The elder sister pencils his eyes
The mother's brother's wife fans his head,
The women sing their joy.
WILLIAM G. ARCHER, SONGS FOR THE BRIDE: WEDDING RITES OF RURAL INDIA 117 (1985).




know through our reading, viewing, and listening to Fiddler on the Roof.97
Like the more recent versions of arranged marriages discussed, even the
modem Jewish ceremonies include community involvement. The ketubah is
a set of solemn promises regarding the mutual obligations of husband and
wife. It is signed by the bride and groom in front of a community of
witnesses, who promise to be supportive of the couple. 98
The community was involved in traditional (usually arranged) Chinese
marriages, too. Consistent with the Chinese emphasis on reverence for
ancestors, note the respect paid by the bride to the groom's senior relatives.
When the chairs arrive in the bridegroom's home, three ritual offerings are
made: the couple first pay homage to Gods of Heaven and Earth, then to the
Kitchen God, and then to the ancestors. At each altar offerings of food, fruit,
and flowers were laid before the actual rituals were begun. The bridegroom
inserts fresh incense sticks into the bowls before kowtowing side by side
with his bride. These rites are necessary to give spiritual validation to the
marriage. Then the couple is led by an elderly woman, usually of the same
clan, to pay respect (by kowtowing) to the boy's parents, uncles, aunts, the
older brothers and sisters-in-law, and any other senior relatives present. This
is the formal introduction of the bride into the house and clan, and is the
social validation of the marriage. 99
97. In the play, the opening song (aptly entitled "Tradition") involves the role of
tradition. Note the similarity to Carol Rose's description of custom:
Custom thus suggests a means by which a 'commons' may be managed-a means
different from exclusive ownership by either individuals or governments. The
intriguing aspect of customary rights is that they vest property rights in groups that
are indefinite and informal, yet nevertheless capable of self-management. Custom
might be the medium through which such an informal group acts generally; thus, the
community claiming customary rights was really not an 'unorganized' public at all.
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 711, 742 (1986).
98. For a description of the ceremony, including the prayers recited by the couple, the
rabbi, and the community, see RABBI RAMI SHAPIRO, A RABBI'S MANUAL, at
http://www.judaca.com.
99. FRANCIS L.K. HSU, UNDER THE ANCESTORS' SHADOW: KINSHIP, PERSONALITY, AND
SOCIAL MOBILITY IN CHINA, cited at http://www.chcp.org/Vwedding.html.
A century ago, Greek weddings involved "a species of marital godfather" called the
koumbdros. He was "usually the most influential, and also, necessarily, the most obliging
relative or friend of either the bride or bridegroom .... He promises to provide largely for the
wife and any children she may have should she be left destitute and widowed." LOUISE
JORDAN MILN, WOOINGS AND WEDDINGS IN MANY CLIMES 336 (1900).
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Finally, the African-American "broom jumping" ceremony involves
community. Instructions for the contemporary wedding include the
following:
Have your host ask guests to form a circle around the couple as they stand in
front of the broom on the floor.
The host should discuss the symbolism behind the broom as it relates to the
joining of the couple and the combining of two families, and the need for the
community to support the couple. Meanwhile have the couple hold the
broom handle together and sweep around in a circle until the host or
designated person is finished talking. 100
The Rationale for Community Involvement. Does the community become
involved to strengthen marriages (advancing the individual goals of the
couple) or is the relationship more reciprocal than that-one where
marriages also strengthen the community? Some historical context will be
useful here, too, since marriages historically were so integral to the passing
on of land and creation of wealth.101 It is also interesting to look briefly at
the institutions of arranged marriages and mail order brides. The civil law
terminology of the "marital community," like the "Little Commonwealth" of
the Plymouth Colonies, suggests instead that marriage and family are
separate from the larger society, though mirroring it. 102
The modem Sikh wedding is followed by the garlanding of the couple and blessings by
relations and friends. God is the witness to their vows as "[a] union of not only two hearts but
also of two families takes place." ANAD KARAJ, CEREMONIES OF Buss 117, 62 (1996).
In Burma, though the marriages are love matches, not only do the bride and groom's
families attend the wedding, but also one representative each from every household in the
village and the village headmen and elders. MELFORD E. SPIRO, KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE IN
BURMA: A CULTURAL AND PSYCHODYNAMIC ANALYSIS 183 (1977).
100. http://www.melanet.com/awgthistory/jumping.html. The history of the broom
ceremony discussion comes from Harriet Cole's "Jumping the Broom: The African-American
Wedding Planner" 17-18. For a similar ritual, the Thai Rod-Nam-Sang, see Kriengsak
Niratpattanasai, Thai Wedding Customs, cited at
http://www.apmforum.com/columns/thai 15.htm.
101. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEw PROPERTY (1975);
John L. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86
MICH L. REV. 722 (1988).
102. The "Little Commonwealth" statement comes from Governor John Winthrop's
speech, A Modell of Christian Charity, in 2 WINTHROP PAPERS 292, 294 (Massachusetts
Historical Society 1931) (Sermon entitled "Christian Charity" preached aboard The Arabela,
Massachusetts Bay, 1630). For the view that marriage was a civil contract, and not a
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Is community involvement and participation necessary for a strong
marriage? Sociological evidence suggests that frequent contact with support
mechanisms, family and community, does help marriages (and I will recount
some of this). It is not clear whether we have traditions after the marriage
ceremony itself that encourage such participation, 10 3 and can see how the
modem emphasis on autonomy and mobility work against involvement
except when the married ask for it. This tension with the autonomy values is
worth exploring at some length.
The different prescriptions for the problem of repeated marital violence
provide a snapshot of this problem. 104 The most popular current legislative
solution, mandatory arrest, began on the showings of social science research
done initially by Lawrence Sherman using randomly assigned control groups
in Minneapolis. 10 5 Sherman has since obtained grants to replicate the study
in six American cities and has found that in some instances, particularly
where the husband-assailants were unemployed, mandatory arrest worsens
the chance of recidivism rather than improving it. 10 6 In a talk at the
University of Virginia during the fall of 1999, Sherman spoke of a new
youthful offender "restorative justice" program tested in New Zealand,
based upon community involvement much like that of the Navajo nation. 10 7
All the emphasis on community discussed above runs counter to another
distinctly American trend-family autonomy. 10 8 For example, in the early
sacrament, see EUGENE AUBREY STRATTON, PLYMOUTH COLONY: ITS HISTORY AND PEOPLE
144, 1620-91 (1986).
103. An exception might be the baby shower, although arguably that is to enhance
parenting rather than marriage.
104. See, e.g., Dennis P. Saccuzzo, How Should The Police Respond To Domestic
Violence: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis Of Mandatory Arrest, 39 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 765 (1999).
105. See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of
A rrestfor Domestic Assault, 49 Am. Soc. REV. 261 (1984).
106. See Richard A. Berk & Lawrence W. Sherman, Police Responses to Family
Violence Incidents: An Analysis of an Experimental Design with Incomplete Randomization,
83 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N. 70 (1988); Janell D. Schmidt & Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest
Deter Domestic Violence?, in Do ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 43-53 (Eve S.
Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996); Lawrence Sherman et al., The Variable Effects of
Arrest on Criminal Careers: The Milwaukee Domestic Violence Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1992); Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal
Law: Evaluating Arrest for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1(1992).
107. See Sherman & Smith, supra note 35.
108. For one account of the trend toward autonomy, see JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE
COLONY 50-51 (2d ed. 2000).
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Puritan colonies, families were expected to deal with their own problem
children. 109 It was only if they could not that the community, through its
appointed elders, would adjudge whether a son was "rebellious" and
ungovernable by his parents. In a similar vein, it was the head of household
(usually the husband) who was responsible for his wife's and children's
attendance at church services. 1 10
A number of legal academics have written both favorably and
unfavorably about autonomy. For example, Carl Schneider has argued that
courts give families autonomy, particularly with respect to dealing with
children, for a number of reasons, among which are the courts' relative lack
of knowledge and expertise. 111 Elizabeth and Robert Scott, as part of their
fiduciary principle, 112 treat being "left alone" as part of the reward of good
parenting. Jana Singer criticizes at least some autonomy giving because it
gives the dominant adult (usually a male) so much power over the less
powerful in the household.11 3
One obvious way in which the state's lack of interference privileges
families (abuses of that power aside) stems from the additional opportunities
for agreement and growth of parenting bestowed on marriage. When others,
such as putative fathers, 114 grandparents,11 5 and well-meaning strangers, 11 6
cannot second-guess decisions, families can thrive. 117 Of course, this is not
109. See John R. Sutton, Stubborn Children: Law and Socialization of Deviance in the
Puritan Colonies, 15 FAM. L.Q. 31 (1981).
110. See, e.g., 1 Hening [Va. Session Laws] 434 (March, 1657-8); 2 Hening [Va.
Session Laws] 165-66 (December 1662, art. IV).
I 11. CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION To FAMILY LAW
213-14 (2d ed. 2000); see also Carl E. Schneider, Religion and Child Custody, 25 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 879 (1992) (discussing Kilgrow and other cases where parents conflict over
religious values or education).
112. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert F. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV.
2401 (1995).
113. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443.
114. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So.
2d 885 (Ala. 1958); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 349 (1868); SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note
111, at 1331-33. But see Callender v. Skiles, 1999 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 43; Apitz v. Dames, 287
P.2d 585 (Or. 1955).
115. See Hough v. Hough, 590 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa 1999); Herndon v. Tuhey, 857
S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993); Penland v. Harris, 520 S.E.2d 105 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Hawk v.
Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993); In re Nearhoof, 359 S.E.2d 587 (W. Va. 1987).
116. This could have been a legitimate reason for the parents' concern in In re Phillip
B. v. Warren B., 188 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1983).
117. See generally Margaret F. Brinig, The Supreme Court's Impact on Marriage,
1967-90, 41 HOWARD L.J. 271 (1998). But see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the
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arguing that others cannot have a positive influence in children's lives. Of
course they can, and they do. Sometimes, in fact, the grandparents or other
relatives have the most important and most stable relationships. 118 In such
cases, they should be treated precisely like parents for custody and visitation
purposes. 119
Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1784-95
(1993).
118. See, e.g., Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824 (Va. 1986) (giving stepmother given
custody over birth mother after custodial father's death); Patrick v. Byerley, 325 S.E.2d 99
(Va. 1985) (awarding former stepmother awarded custody where natural mother abandoned
child); Watson v. Shepard, 229 S.E.2d 897 (Va. 1976) (awarding maternal aunt and her
husband, who had served as the child's guardian, custody over birth mother but were not
permitted to adopt the child). As we will see, the American Law Institute calls such people
"de facto" parents and grants them many of the same rights as birth parents to custody and
visitation. Such a finding is different from the burden-shifting that went on in the Troxel case,
where the mother had to prove that not allowing the children to visit the grandparents more
than they already were was in their best interests.
Justice Stevens seems to intimate an even greater willingness to allow the state to
supervise families: "The almost infinite variety of family relationships that pervade our ever-
changing society strongly counsel against the creation by this Court of a constitutional rule
that treats a biological parent's liberty interest in the care and supervision of her child as an
isolated right that may be exercised arbitrarily." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 90 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. The class of people permitted custodial allocations is much broader than
grandparents, and would include, for example, same-sex partners of a parent. The ALl treat
"de facto parents" in the following sections:
American Law Institute, Principles of Family Dissolution, § 2.03 (1) (Tent. Draft No.
3, Part I ) (1998), provides in part:
(c) A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel
who, for a significant period of time not less than two years,
(i) lived with the child and,
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the
agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a
complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions,
(a) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child,
or
(b) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great as
that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived.
§ 2.21 Allocations of Responsibility to-Individuals Other Than Legal Parents
Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000:
(i) The court should allocate responsibility to a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, or
a de facto parent as defined in § 2.03, in accordance with the same standards set forth
in § 2.09 through 2.14, except that
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One of the real hopes behind the covenant marriage movement in
Louisianal 20 (and, to a less publicized extent, Arizona) 12 1 has been the early
and continuing involvement of families and, perhaps, broader communities
with couples. Those who elect the covenant marriage option must undergo at
least five counseling meetings with clergy or lay professionals before the
wedding, and the couple commits to seeking out a counselor-hopefully the
same one-when trying to resolve marriage difficulties before resorting to
divorce in all but the most extreme cases. Research on divorce has found
that counseling stressing communication skills is particularly effective, 122
and, perhaps more important, that positive relationships with family and
community strengthen marriage.1 23
The covenant marriage option available in Louisiana and Arizona allows
unmarried couples to elect between a "standard marriage" with no-fault
divorce, and a "covenant marriage."'124 If they choose the latter alternative,
they must undergo premarital counseling, agree to attempt to resolve
marriage difficulties through counseling except in cases involving violence,
(a) it should not allocate the majority of custodial responsibility to a de facto
parent over the objection of a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who is fit and
willing to assume the majority of custodial responsibility unless
(i) the legal parent or parent by estoppel has not been performing a
reasonable share of parenting functions, as defined in § 2.03(6), or
(ii) the available alternatives would cause harm to the child; and
(b) it should limit or deny an allocation otherwise to be made if, in light of the
number of other individuals to be allocated responsibility, the allocation would
be impractical in light of the objectives of this Chapter.
120. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9, § 102 (2000).
121. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-901 (2000). See generally Margaret F. Brinig, Economics,
Law, and Covenant Marriage, 16 GENDER IssuEs 4 (1998).
122. Scott M. Stanley et al., Strengthening Marriages and Preventing Divorce: New
Directions in Prevention Research, 44 FAM. RELATIONS 392 (1995) (reporting on the
Prevention and Relationship Enhancement Program (PREP) 18-year follow-up study). The
program focuses on couples' communication skills and handling of conflict. Id. at 394.
123. Lawrence A. Kurdek, Marital Stability and Changes in Marital Quality in Newly
Wed Couples: A Test of the Contextual Model, 8 J. SoC. & PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 27
(1991). Kurdek found, based on nearly 400 couples' self reports and holding other
demographic and personality variables constant, that the more stable and higher quality
marriages (after a year of marriage) had significantly better satisfaction with their level of
social support. Id. at 36 & Table 2, 45. Unlike many other observed variables, this was true
for both husbands and wives. Id. at 40 & Table 4.
124. The Louisiana legislation and a National Science Foundation project to study its
implementation can be found on the web site www.marriagematters.virginia.edu.
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and submit to a more traditional mixed fault and no-fault divorce system. 125
Although the principles behind the proposals in both states are
overwhelmingly supported, according to survey research only about forty
percent of the people surveyed in Louisiana knew that the new legislation
existed. 126 Empirical analysis of the two to three percent of Louisiana
couples taking advantage of the covenant marriage choice so far reveals that
there is no difference in their strength of their religious belief or practice
from the couples electing "standard marriage." They are disproportionately
African-American and are less wealthy than the choosers of "standard
marriage." In the majority of covenant marriages, the couple indicated that
the woman was the one most enthusiastic about the choice. 12 7
Children somehow turn marriages into communities.128  Many
studies, 129 including some of my own, 130 have noted that the divorce rate
falls when the family includes children born during the marriage. The
125. Brinig, supra note 121, at 5. The legislation is also discussed in Scott & Scott,
supra note 20.
126. E-mail correspondence from Steven L. Nock, University of Virginia, Department
of Sociology, Feb. 14, 2000.
Further, when a graduate student and sociologist applied for a marriage license in one-
fourth of all Louisiana counties, they found that the "Not covenant marriage" box had been
checked for them in some instances, while in virtually none was the new law explained. Id. In
short, Nock explains, "[v]irtually nobody hears about the option when they apply for a
license. So the only people asking for covenant marriages are those who heard about it in
church." Id.
127. See id.
128. This is certainly a part of Catholic doctrine. See Pope John Paul il, Familiaris
Consortio [On the Family] No. 21 (1981); Pope John Paul II, Letter to Families, No. 7, 8
(1994) (advocating that marriage is a communion of two giving rise to a community of
persons greater than the two); Theresa Stanton Collett, Marriage, Family and the Positive
Law, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 467, 476 (1996).
129. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker et al., An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J.
POL. ECON. 1141 (1977); Andrew Cherlin, The Effect of Children on Marital Dissolution, 14
DEMOGRAPHY 265 (1977); Joan Huber & Glenna Spitze, Considering Divorce: An Expansion
of Becker's Theory of Marital Instability, 86 AM. J. Soc. 75 (1980); S. Philip Morgan &
Ronald R. Rindfuss, Marital Disruption: Structural and Temporal Dimensions, 90 AM. J.
Soc. 1055 (1985); Scott J. South & Glenna Spitze, Determinants of Divorce Over the Marital
Life Course, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 583, 588 (1986); Linda J. Waite et al., The Consequences of
Parenthood for the Marital Stability of Young Adults, 50 AM. Soc. REV. 850 (1985); see also
Arland Thornton, Changing Attitudes Toward Separation and Divorce: Causes and
Consequences, 90 AM. J. Soc. 856 (1985) (noting that attitudes about divorce unfavorable
when preschoolers were present).
130. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Weak Men and Disorderly Women,
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (forthcoming 2002, Cambridge
University Press); Brinig & Allen, supra note 57.
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interesting question for this paper is why that occurs. The obvious reasons
include a sense of responsibility, 131  inculcation of altruism, 132
investment1 33 or joy in creation. 134 Perhaps a more subtle reason is that
children teach us to give unconditionally and to think of others first. Their
presence assures a more permanent relationship between the adults involved
(since parenting will go on after divorce, even if marital relations do not). 13 5
Hence, two of the three conditions can be ascribed to the covenantal nature
of families and are present even without outside involvement. 136 And, of
course, the presence of children assures that the state will also be interested
in the family, for with children come such things as state-mandated
education, compulsory use of child care seats, required vaccinations, and
mandatory issuance of social security numbers.
V. REACHING THE LIMIT
As might be expected, the positive reach of community involvement in
marriages, and families more generally, does have its limits. Mentioning that
131. See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 47 (1984); Elizabeth Scott, Rational
Decisionmaking for Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 31 (1990); Judith T. Younger,
Responsible Parents and Good Children, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 489 (1996). We may feel guilty
when we divorce and children are present in a way that we would not otherwise. See Gary S.
Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL. ECON. 385 (1993) (reporting
on role of guilt in assuring respect of and support for aged parents).
132. Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring
Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393, 402 (1998).
133. Cherlin certainly works on this assumption, though his results are inconclusive.
Cherlin, supra note 129, at 288; see also Brinig & Buckley, supra note 132, at 402; MARTIN
ZELDER, CHILDREN AS PUBLIC GOODS AND DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS (1989).
134. A number of papers suggest that (post-partum depression aside) most people feel
a sense of accomplishment and happiness at the birth of the child. In fact, this may be one of
our oldest and most deeply ingrained emotions. See, e.g., Anthony T. Padovano, Marriage:
The Most Noble of Human Achievements, 238 CATH. WORLD 140 (1995) ("Marriage unites
the human family more profoundly than any religion. The world is one with the wedding
couple. Children, born from this union, move us with love more universally than any other
reality.").
135. For a lengthy discussion of this point, see JUNE R. CARBONE, FROM PARENTS TO
PARTNERS (2000); Martha L. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family
Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181-215 (1995); Virginia Held, Mothering Versus Contract, in
BEYOND SELF INTEREST 287, 287-304 (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1990); Jenifer Nedelsky,
Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 7
(1989).
136. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW
AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY (2000).
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it is problematic when people begin asserting rights instead of feeling
obligations is definitely not something new. 137 Michael H. v. Gerald D. 138
involved a challenge to the California presumption of legitimacy for
children born within ongoing marriages. The case was brought by the birth
father of a child born of the wife's adulterous relationship. Later, the child
herself, through her guardian, was joined as a party. Justice Scalia wrote
about the child's claim: "When the husband or wife contests the legitimacy
of their child, the stability of the marriage has already been shaken. In
contrast, allowing a claim of illegitimacy to be pressed by the child--or,
more accurately, by a court-appointed guardian ad litem-may well disrupt
an otherwise peaceful union." 139 In fact, the plurality's holding that the birth
father had no protectable liberty interest in his relationship with the child
was limited to the liberty interest as the "substantive parental rights [of] the
natural father of a child conceived within, and born into, an extant marital
union that wishes to embrace the child." 140
This claim by Michael might not have been the most effective channel
for preserving his relationship with the child, Victoria. 14 1 In fact, a more
successful strategy might have been to work on his relationship with Gerald
and Carole, the adults involved, rather than to attempt to vindicate his
constitutional rights. 142 In this sense, the limit is reached when we are
talking about relationships that are in are in effect "beyond law." 143 Thus,
137. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 109 (1991); Scott & Scott, supra note 20; Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights
of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 ETHICS 8-9 (1980); Carl
E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1803, 1835-70 (1985); Lynn D. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The
Constitutional Rights of Children, 27 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 321 (1996); Barbara B. Woodhouse,
Children's Rights: The Destruction and Promise of Family, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 497.
138. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
139. Id. at 131. Note the similarity to the claims made on behalf of the children in
Troxel by Justice Stevens's dissent. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66-72 (2000)
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
140. Id. at 127.
141. Carl Schneider, in a series of questions on Michael H. and our later discussions at
the 1996 family law symposium at the University of Utah, suggested this approach.
142. As Justice O'Connor writes in Troxel, "[in an ideal world, parents might always
seek to cultivate the bonds between grandparents and their grandchildren." Troxel, 530 U.S.
at 59.
143. The subtitle of my book, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT (2000), supra note 136,
on the limits of law and economics, when applied to families is "Beyond the Law and
Economics of the Family." One of my points is that the law quite often (as with emancipation
by age, divorce, and adoption) tries to cut off relationships that are in fact permanent, and
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we have a situation akin to the very deep and thoroughly unenforceable
implied contract between parent and child. 144
In what may be a variant on this theme, David Meyer, in his recent
article, 145 suggests a nontraditional solution for some adoption cases: 146
granting the adoption to vindicate the psychological relationship between
adoptive parents and child, but preserve visitation and a kind of residual
claimant status for the birth father.
An inquiry should be broadened to cases of non-parent visitation like
Troxel and the other grandparent cases, 147 where, of course, Justice Stevens
in dissent suggested a similar analysis. 148 Because of the pluralism in
American family forms, some interests of people who have served as
stepparents,149  co-parents in same-sex relationships, 150  and foster
thus "beyond law." My suggestion here is related but a bit different-it is that law reaches its
useful limit when we carve "rights" out of relationships to the point where really nothing is
left. Temporally we are speaking about a horizontal relationships, not vertical ones.
144. Brinig, supra, note 80.
145. David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving The Constitutional Dilemma of the
Faultless Father, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 753 (1999) (suggesting that in cases where fathers have
neither abandoned their children nor have otherwise been "unfit," but where the children have
strong relationships to families who would adopt them, there should be "the limited allowance
for adoption without terminating the rights of biological parents"). He also suggests why this
intermediate approach would be both socially desirable and constitutional. Id. at 813-45.
146. Meyer is writing particularly about cases like "Baby Richard," see O'Connell v.
Kirchner, 513 U.S. 1138 (1995), and "Baby Jessica," In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa
1992), but discusses the whole line of Supreme Court unwed father cases.
147. See, e.g., Hough v. Hough, 590 N.W.2d 556 (Iowa 1999); Herndon v. Tuhey,
857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993); Penland v. Harris, 520 S.E.2d 105 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Hawk
v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993); In re Nearhoof, 359 S.E.2d 587 (W. Va. 1987).
148. Stevens's dissent states:
There is at a minimum a third individual, whose interests are implicated in every case
to which the statute applies-the child .... While this Court has not yet had occasion
to elucidate the nature of a child's liberty interests in preserving established familial
or family-like bonds, it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and
families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships,
so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced
in the equation. At a minimum, our prior cases recognizing that children are,
generally speaking, constitutionally protected actors require that this Court reject any
suggestion that when it comes to parental rights, children are so much chattel. The
constitutional protection against arbitrary state interference with parental rights
should not be extended to prevent the States from protecting children against the
arbitrary exercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in
the welfare of the child.
149. See OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (governing persons who have established
emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship based on having had physical custody of a
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parents' 5 ' need to be recognized. When there are non-standard family
forms, and a grandparent, stepparent, or same-sex partner has been
performing the same role as biological parents usually do, equitable
doctrines like estoppel may bar the parent from asserting that the other adult
is not entitled to visit, or in extreme cases have custody of, the child. 152
Otherwise, I would suggest that third party interests not be hardened into
"rights,"'153 particularly when, as in Michael H., the child is in an ongoing
child or residing in the same household within six months preceding filing of an action,
except unrelated foster parent); In re Marriage of Carey, 544 N.E.2d 1293 (111. App. Ct. 1989)
(granting standing to long-time custodial stepmother); In re Marriage of Osborne, 901 P.2d
12 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing stepmother who had physical custody of child after death
of her husband to intervene in prior divorce action); Fisher v. Fisher, 670 P.2d 572 (Nev.
1983) (granting ex-stepparents standing to seek guardianship); In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710
(Utah 1990) (stepparent may intervene because of stepparent relationship and legal obligation
to support the child); Paquette v. Paquette, 499 A.2d 23 (Vt. 1985) (granting standing to
stepfather to raise custody issue in divorce action against child's mother); Garber v. Rupert,
No. 3-01828-9, 1999 WL 512064 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (giving custody of child to
stepparent who was also father of child's half-sibling and extending visitation with the other).
The American Law Institute, in Principles of Family Dissolution § 2.03, recognizes as
"de facto parents" "adults, not the child's legal parent, who for a significant period have
resided with the child and who for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and
with the parent's consent, have regularly performed a large portion of the caretaking functions
for the child." "De facto" parents can be granted custodial responsibility. Id. §§ 2.04(l)(b),
221. A state currently providing for such treatment is Wisconsin. See In re H.S.H.-K., 533
N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995).
150. In re Astonn G., 635 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Fam. Ct., 1995) (giving custody to former
lesbian lover of deceased mother over biological grandmother of child's half-sibling). J.A.L.
v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1315 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (granting standing on best interest grounds to
former lesbian long-term partner, who assumed parent-like role toward the child until the
couple separated ten months after the child's birth and visited the child regularly for more
than a year thereafter); Fowler v. Jones, 949 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (granting
standing when co-parent had actual care, control and possession of child for not less than six
months); In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (finding standing appropriate when
petitioner has parent-like relationship with child based on co-parenting agreement with
biological parent, and the relationship has been disrupted).
151. In re J.C., 417 So. 2d 529 (Miss. 1982); In re Francisco A., 866 P.2d 1175 (N.M.
1993); In re Adoption of L., 462 N.E.2d 1165 (N.Y. 1984) (applying to would-be adoptive
parents like the DeBoers).
152. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution §
2.03 (l)(b) (parent by estoppel); (c) (de facto parent) (Preliminary Draft No. 9, 1999).
153. Robert Ellickson has helpfully suggested analogizing to the difference between
standards for entitlement to property and default liability rules. Telephone Interview with
Robert Ellickson (March 6, 2000). The more intrusive the "piece" of the relationship granted
to outsiders, the less likely the outsiders should be to win. As the number of "pieces"
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intact family relationship. In family law terms, granting rights to third
parties disrupts the intimacy1 54 and autonomy155 necessary for families-
marriages and children-to thrive. 156
A. The Institutional Economics Case for Community
We can perform the same sort of analysis using a different set of tools-
those of institutional economics. One strand of this work can be
characterized as the social norms literature. Although this new field of law
and economics is vast enough to be spawning its own conferences, 157 it has
flourished in sociology for many years, 158 in economics for at least a
generation, 159 in law, 160 and in psychology. 161 "In a sufficiently close-knit
increases, even with relatively weak dispersion of rights, the more closely the situation
resembles Heller's anti-commons.
154. See REGAN, supra note 31.
155. Two leading cases vindicating family autonomy principles are Kilgrow v.
Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1958) (involving parents in intact family who disagreed on
school for child); and State v. Rhodes, 6 N.C. 453 (1868) (prosecuting husband who struck
wife). See also Wait v. Pierce, 209 N.W. 475 (Wis. 1926). See generally MILTON C. REGAN,
ALONE TOGETHER: LAW AND THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE (1998).
156. The incentives necessary for parents are thoughtfully described in Scott & Scott,
supra note 112; those for spouses in Scott & Scott, supra note 20 (Relational Contract).
157. Robert Ellickson is probably the leading scholar. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WrrHouT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DIsPUTEs (1991). For other sources, see
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV.
338, 339 & nn. 19-38 (1997); Posner, supra note 19.
158. A useful survey can be found in McAdams, supra note 157, at 339 & n.1.
McAdams finds that "the initial force behind norm creation is the desire individuals have for
respect or prestige, that is, for the relative esteem of others." Id. at 342. If the consensus is
that some behavior X deserves esteem, "a norm will arise if the esteem benefits exceed, for
most people, the costs of engaging in X. Conversely, if the consensus condemns X, a norm
will arise if, for most people, the esteem costs exceed the benefits of engaging in X." Id. at
358.
159. For citations, see McAdams, supra note 157, at 339 & n.2.
160. ELLICKSON, supra note 157; Anita Bernstein, Better Living Through Crime and
Tort, 76 B.U. L. REV. 169, 177-80 (1996); Herbert Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of the Law, 26
L. & Soc. REV. 565 (1992); William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 545; Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181
(1996); Paul Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453
(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996); Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of
the "Gypsies, " 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993). Perhaps the leading example of the success of this
phenomenon is the use of "business norms" in the UCC. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1-102(l)(b); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
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group, where norms are well-defined and nonlegal sanctions are effective,
the law has little impact on behavior." 162 The way it does influence
behavior is quite complex, so that sometimes the group's own norms
dominate, sometimes the external law does, and sometimes law "reduce[s]
the group's ability to regulate its members." 163
In many communities, outside norms and legal rules operate to regulate
various aspects of family behavior. For example, community norms will
determine the mechanism for courtship, 164 while legal rules will govern the
exact requisites for marriage. 165 The intragroup norms1 66 are frequently
more efficient than the "blunt instrument" of the law because they take
advantage of the common language, features, and traditions of the group. 167
For example, the Native American peacemaker court discussed earlier
probably functions better than the civil justice system for members of the
Navajo tribe. It accounts for hozh6 and each community member's desire to
be restored to balance. 168 The difficulty, as Posner might describe it, occurs
when the legal system attempts to regulate intrafamily behavior. According
to family law rules, this interference violates the autonomy principle. In the
limiting examples we talk about here, it also interferes with the valid
operation of intrafamily norms. 169
A related strand of the law and economics explanation of the importance
of community is the idea of network externalities.170 This concept means
the web of effects a single action (or nonaction) has on a larger whole
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Robert Scott,
Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987).
161. See Boyd & Richardson, Culture and Cooperation, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST
111-31 (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1990).
162. Posner, supra note 19, at 133.
163. Id. at 137.
164. See, e.g., BETH BAILEY, FROM FRONT PORCH TO BACK SEAT: COURTSHIP IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 17 (1988); Margaret Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.L. EcON.
& ORG. 203 (1990).
165. Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age Restrictions, 22 J. FAM. L. 1 (1983).
166. See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 20.
167. See Opting Out Of The Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations In The
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
168. In Irving Altman, Polygamous Family Life: The Case of Contemporary Mormon
Fundamentalists, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 367, the "fundamentalist Mormons" had their own
culture for holidays and anniversaries as well as their own dispute resolution system designed
to accommodate plural marriages illegal in the wider community.
169. See Scott & Scott, supra note 20 (referring to many of these as transactional
norms).
170. A useful survey can be found in McAdams, supra note 157.
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because of other existing relationships. 17 1 The relationship may be one of
affinity (like marriage) or status (such as that of parent and child). For
example, assume that a couple has tried for many years to have children, but
is plagued with infertility problems. Their ensuing marital problems 172 will
no doubt be the source of concern to their own parents, siblings, and even
extended family. All of these family members, who may offer advice or
sympathy, will in some way feel the loss as their own, and will rejoice with
the couple when they adopt a child or finally conceive.
171. In the family law literature, see MARTHA Mm ow, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF (1997).
See REGAN, supra note 31 (finding that community interests override individual preference
because the unfettered pursuit of autonomy is not ultimately fulfilling); see also June
Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31 Hous. L. REV.
359 (1994).
172. Elliott Dorff explains:
First, if one suffers from infertility, the doctor will immediately suggest monitoring
the woman's temperature to time intercourse to coincide with ovulation. That makes
good sense biologically, but it transforms intercourse into a mechanical act, robbing
it of much of its romance. Moreover, both husband and wife begin to see themselves
as having to accomplish a goal. Consequently, every month they find out whether
they succeeded or not. They get an "A" or an "F," nothing in between. This affects
their own sense of being a man or woman, for everything they have been taught since
childhood associates manhood with begetting children and womanhood with bearing
them. One's whole sense of sexual identity needs to be readjusted and reaffirmed in
the context of difficulty in having children, and the prospect of having none. There is
also a 'sense that the future of the marriage depends upon whether or not they can
have children, for that, after all, was part of their dreams when they wed.
Elliott Dorff, Jewish Approaches to Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 21 WHITTIER L.
REV. 391, 398 (1999); see also LORBER, In Vitro Fertilization and Gender Politics, in
EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 117 (E. Baruch, A. D'Adamo et al. eds. 1988)
(reporting that when the husband did not want a child but the wife did, the couple remained
married, but when the husband wanted a child but the wife did not, the couple often obtained
a divorce).
Though the infertile couple may have marital problems, some studies show that a couple
successfully treated by AID or In Vitro Fertilization will have no worse chances of survival
(perhaps because, at least in the case of IVF, there is selection for marital stability before one
may join the program). The difference in the separation rates in one study of Norwegian AID
families in contrast to a matched non-AID population was not statistically significant. Erik
Bendvold et al., Marital Break-Up Among Couples Raising Families by Artificial
Insemination by Donor, 51 FERTIL. & STERILITY 980, 982 (1989). These authors suggest that
other studies exaggerated the high separation rate of infertile couples because they did not
compare separation rates to populations that were demographically similar. M.T. Hearn et al.,
Psychological Characteristics of In Vitro Fertilization Participants, AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY, Feb. 1987, at 269, 273. It should be noted, however, that IVF programs may
select for patients whose marriages appear stable, thus increasing the likelihood of adjusting




Another strand in the law and economics explanations of community
comes from the work of writers such as David Charny.173 Charny posits that
although there are legal sanctions for breaking promises, "virtually all
commercial transactions involve nonlegal commitments--commitments
enforced only or predominantly by nonlegal sanctions such as concern for
reputation." 174 Charny would allow legal intervention when the parties had
elected nonlegal commitments only when they were gravely mistaken when
the contract was made. 175 Chamy contrasts what he calls an autonomy or
rights-based system of contract 176 with a communitarian system. "An
emerging alternative approach to the problem of nonlegal commitments
seeks to go beyond conceptions of contract based on free choice. This
communitarian approach purportedly accommodates a range of community
interests rather than simply enforcing choices made by the contracting
parties."17
7
Like Posner, Charny suggests that sometimes using legal sanctions
where the parties intended nonlegal ones may distort the remedies the
parties chose for themselves.
173. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions In Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 373 (1990).
174. Id. at 376. Charney lists the specific sanctions as (1) "relationship-specific
prospective advantage," such as a concern for repeat transactions, (2) loss of reputation with
market participants, and (3) the sacrifice of psychic and social goods (guilt, self-esteem, and
so forth). Id. at 393. Thus "[e]ncouraging trust among workers or long-term customers is one
function of the corporate culture of firms and of the feeling of responsibility to clientele that
may develop at schools, banks, or other quasi-public" institutions. Id. at 394.
175. Id. at 377. He goes on to point out that:
If nonlegal pressures are sufficiently powerful to force parties to honor their
commitments, the parties would not reasonably have wished to incur the additional
cost of providing for legal sanctions-a conclusion that will bear directly on contract
interpretation under the "objective" theory of contract. Second, under contract
doctrine courts may impose liability under extracontractual doctrines-such as an
implied duty of good faith or promissory estoppel---on the basis of commitments that
are not legally enforceable as formal contracts.
Id. at 379.
176. These divergent approaches to contract formation and interpretation reflect a
basic incompleteness in autonomy-based theories of contract. Under autonomy- or rights-
based formulations of contract law, the promisor is legally obligated to keep his promise
because he has "intentionally invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds-
moral grounds-for another to expect the promised performance." Id. at 381-82.
177. Id. at 387.
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In the employment relationship, for example, nonlegal sanctions arguably
enforce systems of reciprocation by encouraging mutual gift-giving or by
monitoring effort, and thereby make superfluous the legal rules of contract
and restitution that are largely directed to the same goal. By disrupting
nonlegal systems, legal enforcement of implied limitations on employer
discretion may impoverish rather than empower workers." 17 8
He notes that according to communitarians, intervening may run counter to
the framework of trust the parties established for themselves. 17 9
Furthermore, some communitarians suggest that the intrinsic value of social
collaboration may depend on the parties' experience of a sense of trust not
dependent on coercive public intervention. 180 Some situations suggest that
nonlegal sanctions may in fact work better than the standard legal remedies:
for example, those cases involving "vaguer commitments whose
interpretation depends on 'embedded' norms or expert decisionmaking, and
commitments that have low stakes relative to litigation costs, appear better
suited for nonlegal sanctions."' 18 1
178. Id. at 388; see also MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, MARRIAGE AS SIGNAL (1999),
(reporting to the Donner Conference on Freedom of Contract (the Family), George Mason
University, fall, 1988, that: 'The adversarial character of legal enforcement means that once
resort is had to the law to enforce commitments in an on-going relationship, it is or shortly
will be at an end.").
179. He further states:
First, the prospect of intervention may stifle the development of trust. Individuals
would never have a chance to demonstrate trustworthiness, because any honoring of
commitment could be attributed simply to the deterrent effect of prospective legal
enforcement. The prospect of legal intervention also removes transactors' incentives
to develop the capacity to evaluate the trustworthiness of other transactors. For
example, they have no incentive to gather information about another transactor's
reputation for honesty.
Charny, supra note 173, at 428.
180. Id. at 388-89.
181. Id. at 408-09. Here he mentions especially tight-knit communities where:
... reputation is a perfect substitute for legal enforcement. For that reason, parties
can obtain the advantages of nonlegal third-party decisionmaking by enforcing the
decisionmakers' rulings with reputational sanctions. These enforcement schemes
often accompany trading among close-knit, ethnically or professionally
homogeneous communities, such as the Orthodox Jews of the diamond trade, the
Chinese merchants in Southeast Asian trading communities, and the Birmingham
cotton guild.
Id. at 412 (footnotes omitted).
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C. Information and Signaling
Investments in resources specific to a relationship between identified
parties give rise to "specialization by identity." 182 Such relationships,
which exist over long periods of time (akin to my permanence
requirement), 183 encompass a large variety of activity, involve many
implicit terms, have no explicit balancing of the exchange (akin to my
unconditional love requirement), have three features that are especially
pertinent to this discussion. One is that enforcement is mostly internal (or by
the family itself), while another is that the family contract "creates a
collective identity that affects the transactions of each member with people
outside the family."' 184 Finally, it is embedded in the identity of the partners,
without which it loses its meaning-it is thus nontransferable. 185 The family
(or family firm) thus gives the person an identity "in addition to a past and a
future." 186 Moreover, enforcement of agreements is "internal to the
contract," and is not done through the market. 187 To the extent that outside
forces, including the private market forces, intrude upon the province of the
family, the signal given by "family affiliation" becomes diluted. 188
In a market for partners, in theory at least, a "willingness or
unwillingness to marry conveys a signal to prospective partners of the
signaler's preferences" about the kind of relationship sought. 189 To the
extent that marriage implies a reasonably well understood set of
commitments, it serves as an efficient "information economizing" function
in a search for partners, sorting and matching them relative to other types of
relationships. 19 0
Marriage has this sort of "expressive function":
182. Yoram Ben-Porath, The F-Connection: Families, Friends, and Firms and the
Organization of Exchange, 6 Pop. & DEVEL. REV. 1 (1980).
183. See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 132; Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock,
The Marriage Covenant, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 9 (1999).
184. Ben-Porath, supra note 182, at 3.
185. Id. at4.
186. Id. at5.
187. Id. at 11.
188. Id. at 12.
189. TREBILCOCK, supra note 178.
190. In his discussion, Trebilcock relies heavily on the paper by William Bishop, "Is
He Married?" Marriage as Information, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 245 (1984). Bishop views
marriage as a signal of the sort of sexual arrangement sought by the person married or seeking
marriage; Trebilcock sees the signal as a broader one.
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The concept of "marriage," as compared to "private contract," suggests a
meaning that can be interpreted by third parties without knowing anything
about the particularities of the spouses. Without defending each one of these,
legal efforts at symbolic protection of the parameters of the institution
include age restrictions, restrictions on the number of parties to a marriage,
to the consanguinity of the parties, and to the sex of the parties. Congress
explicitly invoked this power to police the symbol of marriage in passing
what is pointedly titled "The Defense of Marriage Act" . . . . The current
treatment of family law issues upon divorce attempts to respect the principle
that some equality between monetary and nonmonetary contributions is
central to the meaning of marriage. 191
Marriage, to the extent the parties live together, also proves to be an
efficient way to monitor the activities of the other spouse. In particular, as
Frank Buckley and I have written elsewhere, it provides an excellent way to
make sure that the other parent is performing well. 19 2 Although cohabitation
might perform this function, marriage solves the "principal-agent" problem
very effectively, with each spouse able to see for him or herself how time
and money are spent on other members of the family. 193 Similarly, parents
can curb ineffective or excessive discipline. 194
Dispute resolution can also be accomplished more efficiently and
effectively by communities (if not within the families themselves) than by
the legal system. 195 The "neutrals" often have a stake in the relationship's
191. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U.
L. REV. 65, 138-39 (1998).
192. Brinig & Buckley, supra note 90, at 393; see also Judith A. Seltzer,
Consequences of Marital Dissolution for Children, 20 ANNUAL REV. OF SOCIOLOGY 235
(1994) (suggesting few differences in physical custody arrangements despite different court-
ordered patterns, but lower child-support payments by noncustodial fathers); Yoram Weiss &
Robert J. Willis, Children as Collective Goods in Divorce Settlements, 3 J. LAB. ECON. 268,
288 (1985) (describing father's unwillingness to pay child support as a function of his being
able to monitor how the money is spent).
193. Brinig & Buckley, supra note 90, at 408. For discussions of the principal-agent
problem, see Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991); Stephen A.
Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS
& PROC. 134 (1973). As applied to parents, see Scott & Scott, supra note 112.
194. Lupu, supra note 22.
195. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 160; (suggesting the advantages of an extra-legal
dispute resolution system in a well-known merchant community); Jennifer Gerarda Brown &
Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 327 (1994)
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continuation, and they will know more about the particular parties and their
circumstances than will judges in divorce or municipal courts (in cases
where family violence ensues). Restorative justice, as described earlier, can
heal such broken relationships, at least where communities are tight and
reputation within them important.
D. Insurance, or "Distributing the Risks of Regret"196
Any long-term relationship, particularly marriage, involves risks. As
noted before, the wavy pattern of my student's Hindu wedding ring signifies
not only the permanence of marriage but also its ups and downs. The risk
allocation is expressed in the traditional marriage vows: "For richer for
poorer, in sickness and in health." 197 They continue by noting that the
interwoven and continuously changing factors that affect the emotions of a
marriage, and each party's happiness in it, will lead the couple to adopt a
broad strategy of shared responsibility and cooperative adjustment rather
than trying to specify each contingency. 198
Investment in identity is rewarding in families, trust is mutually
beneficial, and "proximity and general involvement create at little expense
the information that is lacking among strangers and generate incentives for
proper behavior. Typically insurance between family members is mutual, an
exchange of promises for aid contingent on the situation of both (or all)
parties."' 199 For example, to ensure support in time of sickness or in
averaging the randomness of individual incomes, the family can be an
effective insurer, and larger families may serve this function either through
many children or through ties extending beyond the nuclear family.
200
("[M]ediators can create value by controlling the flow of private information (variously
eliminating, translating, or even creating it) to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard.").
196. Scott & Scott, supra note 20, at 1267.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1269. The Scotts suggest intramarital obligations "function to maintain the
relationships and are governed largely by social and relational norms," while after termination
of marriage, they will be efficiently enforced by legal coercion upon divorce. Id. at 1298. The
alternative is the "complete contingent claims contract." In relational contracts in general,
such "complete contracting" is not only probably impossible, but also inefficient. See OLIVER
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, AND
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Robert Scott & Charles Goetz, Principles of Relational
Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics:
The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & EcON. 233 (1979).
199. Porath, supra note 183, at 21-22.
200. Id.
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E. Investment in Capital
As mentioned earlier, revolving credit associations of various types are
typical ways in which the immigrant communities help their members. 20 1
There is substantial literature on similar institutions, since they are typical
means of savings in a number of developing countries. 202
Roscas,203 kye, 204 cundinas, 205or tontine 206 all serve the important
function of allowing people to borrow and save when they otherwise would
not have credit markets available to them. For immigrants who have neither
high incomes nor established credit ratings, purchasing durable goods, a key
purpose of these credit associations, would otherwise become an impossible,
or at least time consuming task.207 The rosca or kye allows the newcomer to
trade on his reputation and close social and blood ties to the community (his
social capital). 20 8 In fact, the community will sanction him strongly 20 9 or
make him feel ashamed 2 10 if the loan is not repaid or the member does not
keep contributing to the monthly or weekly pot after he has taken his draw.
201. For a thorough discussion of revolving credit associations, see Posner, supra note
19. For a particularly helpful look at Korean sources of credit both in Korea and Los Angeles,
see IVAN LIGHT &r EDNA BONACICH, IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS: KOREANS IN LOS ANGELES,
1965-1982, 243-72 (1988).
202. For a classic review, see Clifford Geertz, The Rotating Credit Association: A
"Middle Rung" in Development, 10 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 241 (1962). See also
Phillipe Callier, Informal Finance: The Rotating Savings and Credit Association-An
Interpretation, 43 KYKLOS 273 (1990).
203. Timothy Besley et al., The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit
Associations, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 792, 793 (1993).
204. See Posner, supra note 19, at 136; LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 201, at 244.
205. Carlos G. Vdlez-I., Social Change, Commercialization, and Organizational
Complexity of Urban Medican/Chicano Rotating Credit Associations: Theoretical and
Empirical Issues of Adaptation, 41 HUMAN ORG. 107, 113 (1982) (reporting on various
adaptive functions depending upon region and social group involved).
206. In Francophone Africa, see CALLIER, supra note 200; for China, Africa,
Southeast Asia and Japan, see Geertz, supra note 202, at 273; for Mexico, see Velez-1., supra
note 205, at 117-18 (tandas and cudina); for Brazil, see LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 201,
at 257 (panderos).
207. Velez-I., supra note 205, at 113; see LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 201, at 252
(reporting that roscas allow closer ties between community members).
208. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 201, at 272.
209. Besley et al., supra note 203, at 794, 805 (discussing sanctions for defaulting
including loss of one's social collateral). LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 201, at 252-53,
however, explain the effects of the criminal prosecution of one defaulting key organizer. The
Korean community newspaper apparently felt that kyes themselves were illegal. Id. at 257.
210. Geertz, supra note 202, at 247, 262.
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The rosca is not particularly effective as insurance because there is no
guarantee that the "winning" turn of the individual will coincide with his
need.2 11 Even where he can "bid" for an earlier-than-random share, others in
the community may well suffer precisely the same tragedies (such as
property losses due to riots or crop damage due to flood or drought) at the
same moment.
Not only does the revolving credit association give its relatively low-
income members an opportunity to purchase goods or invest in their own
businesses that otherwise would not be available, it also functions to
strengthen the community itself.212 Not only are all members financially
tied to one another, but also they meet periodically at the "winner's" home
or an ethnic restaurant (from the same ethnic group, and for which the
"winner" pays), usually in the context of a feast or other celebration. 213 This
regular meeting, available only to members of the credit association, serves
as a time to exchange information, develop additional social ties (for
example, allowing the children of group members to meet and perhaps
court) and promote the affinity called "union." 214
VI. THE CASE FOR LIMITS-THE ANTICOMMONS
In his ingenious article, The Tragedy of the Anticommons,2 15 Michael
Heller writes about the privatization of Soviet housing stock. The problem
he describes is that too many people have ownership interests in the same
units. In a commons, to which he contrasts the Soviet situation, multiple
owners are each given a privilege to use some resource, and no one has the
right to exclude another. The resource will then be overused. 2 16 With the
anticommons, multiple owners are each given the right to exclude others
from a scarce resource, and no one can effectively use it. 217 The resource is
211. Besley et al., supra note 203, at 793.
212. See, e.g., Geertz, supra note 202, at 246; Vdlez-I., supra note 205, at 111.
213. LIGHT & BONACICH, supra note 201, at 248; Geertz, supra note 202, at 246-48
(Java); see TAN, supra note 18.
214. Anthony Kronman, Contract Laws and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
5, 20 (1985).
215. Heller, supra note 9.
216. Id. at 623-24. Examples include depleted fisheries, overgrazed fields and polluted
air.
As Heller notes, the literature on the subject is vast. He particularly credits Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968) (introducing the
term); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 182-84 (1990) (discussing applications of the tragedy of the commons
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therefore prone to under use-hence the tragedy. He writes that empty
Moscow storefronts are a good example, but that others include Irish
property before the "potato famine," and "upstream" biotechnology patents
that must be secured before new products can be brought to market.2 18 In
fact, he notes, that an anticommons tragedy can appear whenever
governments create new property rights.2 19
In some ways, children possess many of the properties of a commons. In
fact, they have been described as "public goods" of their parents'
and showing sustainable informal management of commons resources). In describing non-
private property, property theorists have characterized ocean fisheries, open ranges, fur
trapping, potlaching, and gold mining as examples of commons property. See ARTHUR F.
McEvoy, THE FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND LAW IN THE CALIFORNIA FIsHERIES
1850-1980, at 257 (1986) (fisheries); Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of
Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & EON. 163, 169-72 (1975) (western
land); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 351-53
(1967) (fur trappers); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property
Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 134 (1954) (fisheries); D. Bruce Johnsen, The
Formation and Protection of Property Rights Among the Southern Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J.
LEG. STUD. 41, 41-42 (1986) (potlaching); John Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and
the California Gold Rush, 20 J.L. & EcON. 421,422-23 (1977) (gold mining).
217. In the former Soviet Union, one owner would be given the right to sell, one to
receive sale revenue, and still others to lease, receive lease revenue, occupy and determine
use. Each could block the other owners from using the space as a storefront, and no one could
set up shop without collecting the consent of all the others. Heller, supra note 9, at 623.
Another real property example comes from the management of Native American lands. See
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 708 (1987); see also John H. Leavitt, Hodel v. Irving: The
Supreme Court's Emerging Takings Analysis: A Question of How Many Pumpkin Seeds Per
Acre, 18 ENVTL. L. 597, 611-12 (1988) (describing the difficulties that the Bureau of Indian
Affairs faces in selling or leasing allotments today); Suzanne S. Schmid, Comment, Escheat
of Indian Land as a Fifth Amendment Taking in Hodel v. Irving: A New Approach to
Inheritance?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739, 741-42 (1989) ("The fractionation of individually
owned Indian trust or restricted land represents one of the outstanding problems in Indian
law.").
218. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Upstream Patents and
Downstream Products: A Tragedy of the Anticommons?, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (reporting
that the need for paying for use of the earlier patents on substances needed to reach further in
genetic research impedes progress in biology). Another intellectual property example Heller
mentions is the need for getting permission from all the many members of a show. Heller,
supra note 9, at 659 & n.270. He notes that use of 'The Brady Bunch" required agreement
from each of the actors portraying Brady kids (and from their parents, while the actors were
still minors), the Brady parents, and the Brady housekeeper, Alice-as is typical of licensing
agreements for such shows. The difficulty of getting agreement, particularly from Maureen
McCormick ("Marcia Brady"), is reported in BARRY WILLIAMS & CHRIS KRESKI, GROWING UP
BRADY 139, 149, 153 (1992).
219. Heller, supra note 9, at 629.
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marriage. 220 Unlike the pond that can be over-fished, parents cannot "over
love" their children. Managing the scarce resource that is children's time can
effectively help parents develop informal norms and institutions. Carol
Rose, 22 1 and Elinor Ostrom 222 have shown how people sometimes develop
informal norms and institutions to manage commons property efficiently. As
Rose notes, when the parents are "locked together" in their relationship,
their common task may reinforce communitarian values and help them learn
to work together.223 Informal coordination and the non-utilitarian value of
overlapping ownership apply on the anticommons end of the property
spectrum as well. 224 Whether anticommons ownership of a particular
resource results in tragedy depends in part on people's ability to cooperate
informally. And this ability, of course, is precisely what is threatened by
granting parental prerogatives 225 to third parties.
220. Martin Zelder, Inefficient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The
Case of No-Fault Divorce, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 507 (1994); see also Nancy Folbre,
Children as Public Goods, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 86, 86 (1994).
221. Rose, supra note 97.
222. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 182-84 (1990) (discussing applications of the tragedy of the
commons and showing sustainable informal management of commons resources).
223. See Rose, supra note 97, at 774-77. Rose points out that formal legal rules, as
opposed to the "unorganized public," may not always reach happy endings. The "comedy of
the commons" occurs when the community benefits more as more members participate. Id. at
767-68 (or "the more the merrier," hence the article's title "Comedy").
224. Heller, supra note 9, 625 & n.17.
225. Note the similarity between property ownership rights and the rights claimed by
parents (and grandparents) in the visitation cases. According to August Honore, her rights
include: Ownership, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 107, 112-28 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961):
(1) the right to exclusive possession;
(2) the right to personal use and enjoyment;
(3) the right to manage use by others;
(4) the right to the income from use by others;
(5) the right to the capital value, including alienation, consumption, waste, or
destruction;
(6) the right to security (that is, immunity from expropriation);
(7) the power of transmissibility by gift, devise, or descent;
(8) the lack of any term on these rights;
(9) the duty to refrain from using the object in ways that harm others;
(10) the liability to execution for repayment of debts; and
residual rights on the reversion of lapsed ownership rights held by others.
See id.; see also JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT To PRIVATE PROPERTY 49 (1988)
(summarizing Honore's list of incidents); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE
L.J. 1315, 1362-63 (1993) (attributing some of these private entitlements to a "Blackstonian"
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Turning to what is more obviously a marital issue, we can see the same
sort of analysis in Katharine Silbaugh's Marriage Contracts and the Family
Economy,226 where Professor Silbaugh struggles with the problem of
whether or not women should be compensated for household services
performed during marriage. In an earlier piece, 227 Silbaugh argued
persuasively that married women are under-compensated for the work they
do (and will probably always be at a financial disadvantage to their
husbands) 228 because they have no legal entitlement to recover for their
significantly greater work around the household. 229 In the second article,
Silbaugh first argues that corrective legal rules shouldn't just compensate
for losses that are themselves the result of legal rules, but instead should
view nonmonetary contributions as a gain to the family. 230 However,
instead of arguing that both paid and unpaid labor should be subjects of
compensation worked through premarital agreements, 23 1 she argues that
children,232 wage labor, and money itself 233 all become highly intimate
within families.234 They are treated as equivalent in her analysis because
bundle). Incidents (1), (2), (3), (6), (7). and (8) would seem to have at least some application
to child custody matters.
226. Silbaugh, supra note 191.
227. Id.
228. For a recent analysis of this problem, see JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
GENDER (1999).
229. In a recent empirical piece, Steve Nock and I calculated that married women
average nearly 36 hours of housework per week (mostly in traditionally "women's work")
compared to about 16.7 hours for their husbands (with a higher proportion of time spent
doing traditionally "men's work"). At the same time, the married women in our sample were
spending an average of 18.52 hours in the paid labor force compared to their husbands' 34.3
hours. See Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Weak Men and Disorderly Women: Divorce
and the Division of Labor, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH (Anthony
Dnes & Robert Rowthom eds., forthcoming 2001). Silbaugh notes that the estimated dollar
value of unpaid household labor in the United States is the equivalent of 24%-60% of Gross
Domestic Product. SILBAUGH, supra note 191, at 99 & nn. 127-28.
230. Silbaugh, supra note 191, at 97.
231. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in The Shadow Of Love: The Enforcement of
Premarital Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145
(1998).
232. Silbaugh, supra note 191, at 105 (finding that the presence of children confers
benefits upon both parents, but nonetheless finds that they should not be permissible subjects
of premarital agreements).
233. Id. at 109-10.
234. Id. at 101, 110.
One of the powerful arguments fathers make when seeking custody upon divorce is that
their work hours, and especially overtime work, was done for the family and was not
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"they are both expressions of affection as well as materially beneficial. '235
At the end, she finds that "the goal of legal parity necessitates a solution that
changes the legal status of wage labor within marriage, rather than the status
of domestic labor. In order to treat the monetary and nonmonetary aspects of
marriage equally, we should not enforce monetary premarital
agreements." 2 3 6
Here, as in the Scotts' Parents as Fiduciaries terms, law may reduce the
incentives (rewards) for optimal behavior by parents. 2 37 The same reasoning
something they would have contemplated in the abstract. They therefore find it difficult to
swallow the idea, present in its most vivid form in the "primary caretaker" custody rules, that
time spent directly with children is somehow qualitatively different from time spent working
for them. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND 177-83 (1997) (describing a 32 year old
blue collar worker and father of three (in an intact marriage) who works 50 to 60 hours a
week stacking and loading boxes). Hochschild writes, "Hours were his source of pride."
Most of my buddies will settle for forty hours and say, "See you later." But
they're buddies without kids. If I had no kids, I'd work forty hours, too.
People look at the hours I work and say, "What, are you crazy?" I earned $40,000
last year. and Deb normally earns $23,000. An older woman in my department is
taking all the overtime she can get to retire and go on a trip. I kid her, "That's my
overtime. You're taking food out of my kids' mouths."...
When I come home, the kids want to see me. They missed me. So even though
I'm exhausted, I'll go downstairs and lie on the floor. They enjoy getting on top of
me and pounding me. They make me give them rides like an elephant. So I play the
game for half an hour before I go to bed.
My dad never went to school events, and I'm not interested in making it a habit
either. But I can see myself doing a double [shift] in the future, and then going to
watch one of my kids play a ball game. I would cheat myself out of sleep to see their
games.
Id. at 179, 180.
235. Id. at 110.
236. Id. at 122-23. In the course of her argument, she spends some time on debates
about whether contractualization of families creates "rights" rather than some less monetary
obligations. Id. at 111-12; see also Carol Weisbrod, The Way We Live Now: A Discussion of
Contracts and Domestic Arrangements, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 777, 782, 786-88.
237. Scott & Scott, supra note 112. The Scotts are apparently writing about the
informal rules couples and parents and children set up to regulate the behavior within the
family-rules like bedtimes or the observance of birthdays. For a systematic examination of
such intrafamilial (and intracommunal) norms, see Altman, supra note 168.
Marriage, like adoption, carries with it a commitment toward permanence that
places it in a different category of relational interests than if it were temporary. A
'justifiable expectation ... that [the] relationship will continue indefinitely' permits
parties to invest themselves in the relationship with a reasonable belief that the
likelihood of future benefits warrants the attendant risks and inconvenience. There is
a clear analogy between the motivational factors that influence human investment
and those that influence economic investments. Jeremy Bentham believed that private
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probably holds true for marriage as well. When many people have rights, as
opposed to moral justifications, to pieces of marriage or children, as
Trebilcock notes when he criticizes enacting multiple choices of marriage
type, the signal becomes confused. 238 When the signal becomes dilute, the
benefits from marriage are not as strong, nor is marriage as well
differentiated from, say, cohabitation. 239
VII. CONCLUSION
Communities are vital for marriage and parenting. Informal
communities should be encouraged socially and through channeling
legislation. 240 Turning these informal ties into legal rights destroys the
relationships.24 1
ownership of property is more likely to maximize social utility than is collective
ownership because "the human motivations which result in production are ... such
that they will not operate in the absence of secure expectations about future
enjoyment of product." The will to labor and the will to invest "depend on rules
which assure people that they will indeed be permitted to enjoy a substantial share of
the product as the price of their labor or their risk of savings."
Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status Of Marriage, Kinship, And Sexual Privacy, 81
MicH. L. REV. 463,486 (1983).
238. TREBILCOCK, supra note 178.
239. See Scott & Scott, supra note 20 at 1330: the option of a unilateral exit at will
signals that commitment to marriage is not distinguishable from commitment in cohabitation
relationships." They posit that this "disconnection" may have contributed to the current
divorce rate, because of the reduction of "the potency of societal norms promoting fidelity,
loyalty, and cooperation in marriage." Id.
240. For example, there might be tax deductions for elder care, continued
differentiation (through removal of the "marriage tax penalty") between marriage and
cohabitation, legislation giving benefits for counseling prior to marriage or divorce, and
generally, more support given to union-building activities. Two such family-strengthening
and completely extra-legal activities that I've found in Iowa City are our block's port-luck
millennium party, including a number of three generation families, and one of my colleague's
holiday cookie-decorating party, to which children and grandchildren are invited, though they
may bring their relations. See Rose, supra note 94, at 779-80 (advocating public access to
unique recreational sites: "recreation educates and socializes us, it acts as a 'social glue' for
everyone, not just those immediately engaged; and of course, the more people involved in any
socializing activity, the better").
241. As Carl Schneider wrote some years ago,
Where a right exists, we prima facie prefer the individual, as the law of substantive
due process illustrates. But the rights schema is often inapposite in the family
context, since there a right against the government is also a right against other family
members. And because we dislike compromising a right against the government, we
are inhibited from looking for ways to encourage compromises or even discussion
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The Finn, Elian Gonzalez and Troxel situations present us with a good
opportunity to reexamine the need for community involvement in families.
At the same time, however, these cases demonstrate the strength of the
emotions involved and the problem arising when splinters of legal rights
replace more normal-and natural-bonds of affection. For the sake of
children (not the power of parents), there should be limits to the exercise of
external legal power. At the same time, we should recognize limits to the
explanatory power of economics. The limit of both is love.
Chart 1. Children Living in Grandparents' Homes





within the family. Indeed the very appeal to law-to an external set of standards
enforced by might-is atomistic in that it circumvents the (no doubt idealized)
standards of family decision: private persuasion and eventual accommodation based
on solicitude for the person with whom one disagrees.
Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MiCH. L. REV. 1803, 1857-58 (1985).
1 realize, of course, that all states have grandparent visitation statutes. The least offensive
are those that restrict claims to (1) cases in which there is already some sort of legal activity
surrounding the family, for example, adoption and divorce and (2) cases in which visitation is
shown to be "in the best interests of the child." I reiterate my position that de facto parents
should be given many of the same rights as are legal parents. See supra note 121. Certainly
that would include many of those grandparents with whom the children live in Chart I (and
particularly those without parents in the home). It would exclude most of those in Chart II.
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Chart 2. Child Care for Preschoolers While Mothers are Working,
Bureau of the Census, January 1998, P-70-91.
2o - II Byfath.,rnh~oa.
t EByV~ndlr.3 to a
I ey ot tr reit .. ,tot.il
l9m 1"91 1993 1991977 1985 1m 1987 198.
D~t.
2001]

